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LIFE-CYCLE JUSTICE: ACCOMMODATING 
JUST CAUSE AND EMPLOYMENT 
ATWILL 
Stewart J. Schwab* 
"You're fired!" Most American workers hearing these words have 
no legal recourse under traditional employment law. Unless they have 
specific protection in a contract - and few nonunion workers do - or 
evidence that the firing violates a specific antidiscrimination statute, 
workers are treated at will. Under this traditional view, an employer 
can fire them for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all.1 
Yet, as any employer who has recently tried to fire a worker will 
complain, the traditional doctrine is now full of holes. In the past 
deca~e or two, courts increasingly have become receptive to worker 
claims of unjust dismissal. Still, the protections remain patchwork 
and the trend uneven. No state court has proclaimed a general right 
of employees against arbitrary dismissal, although the Montana court 
has come close.2 Indeed, the Supreme Courts of California and Michi-
gan, long considered to be among the leading innovators in this area, 
have recently issued major decisions signaling hesitation with ever-
expanding protections for employees. 3 On the legislative side, only 
* Professor of Law, Cornell University. B.A. 1975, Swarthmore College; J.D. 1980, Ph.D. 
(Economics) 1981, University of Michigan. - Ed. For wonderful discussions and comments I 
thank Greg Alexander, Lynn Baker, Chris Bruce, Jim Brudney, John Donohue, Ron Ehrenberg, 
Bob Hillman, Bob Hutchens, Susan Koniak, Saul Levmore, Tom Rowe, Theodore St. Antoine, 
Bob Scott, John Siliciano, Kathy Stone, Steve Thel, Steve Willborn, and workshop participants at 
the University of Virginia Law School Faculty Workshop, the Labor Economics Workshop at 
Cornell University's Industrial and Labor Relations School, and the annual meetings of the 
American Law and Economics Association and the Canadian Law and Economics Association. 
I thank Mike Holden for his fine research assistance. 
1. The classic statement of the at-will doctrine comes from the Supreme Court of Tennessee 
in Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507 (1884): 
All may dismiss their employees at will, be they many or few, for good cause, for no cause or 
even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong .••• The sufficient 
and conclusive answer to the many plausible arguments to the contrary, portraying the evil 
to workmen and to others from the exercise of such authority by the great and strong, is: 
They have the right to discharge their employees. The law cannot compel them to employ 
workmen, nor to keep them employed. 
81 Tenn. at 519-20. 
2. See Crenshaw v. Bozeman Deaconess Hosp., 693 P.2d 487, 492 (Mont. 1984) ("Employers 
can still terminate untenured employees at-will and without notice [but] simply may not do so in 
bad faith or unfairly .••. "). 
3. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988) (denying tort remedies for fir-
ings that breach an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Rowe v. Montgomery Ward 
8 
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Montana, reacting to its extreme court decisions, f has a statute requir-
ing employers to have good cause before firing a worker.5 However, 
the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have recently passed a 
Model Employment Termination Act that would finally abolish the at-
will doctrine for most employees, 6 and we can expect further debate 
over employment at will as legislatures confront the model act. 
Snapshot examinations of current unjust dismissal law have led 
employment law commentators to see only chaos, a set of cases with 
little internal coherence or rationale. A view of the decisions in their 
historical sweep causes commentators to see evolution: in the begin-
ning was employment at will, 7 now chaos exists, the natural ending 
point will be just cause. Most commentators applaud the trend, urge 
its completion, and bemoan any hesitation or backsliding by the 
courts. 8 Their continual refrain is that the United States lags behind 
& Co., 473 N.W.2d 268 (Mich. 1991) (finding that oral statements and handbook did not create 
legitimate expectation that discharges would only be for cause). 
4. See LeRoy H. Schramm, Montana Employment Law and the 1987 Wrongful Discharge 
from Employment Act: A New Order Begins, 51 MONT. L. REV. 94, 108-10 (1990) (noting that 
an association of defense lawyers and insurance companies drafted bill that eventually became 
the Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act). 
5. Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act of 1987, MoNT. CoDE ANN. §§ 39-
2-901 to -914 (1991). 
6. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION Acr OF 1991, 7A U.L.A. 66 (Supp. 1993). The 
Model Act was controversial even among the commissioners. They rejected an attempt to pass a 
uniform act that would have required the commissioners to urge their respective legislatures to 
adopt the law. See id. prefatory note, 7A U.L.A. at 69-70 (Supp. 1993). 
7. Legal historians have debated whether employment at will was truly "the beginning," or 
whether that presumption itself was a radical departure from earlier, status-based conceptions of 
employment. Much of the debate has focused on whether Horace Wood "invented" employment 
at will in his 1870 treatise or accurately was describing legal doctrine of the nineteenth century. 
Compare Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 118 (1976) with Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, The Doubtful Provenance of "Wood's 
Rule" Revisited, 22 ARiz. ST. L.J. 551 (1990). See also Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the 
Employment-at-Will Rule Revisited, 23 ARiz. ST. L.J. 733 (1991). 
8. The strongest prediction of the demise of employment at will comes from Professor Peck, 
who begins his important article by noting: 
At times one is tempted, despite the hazards, to make predictions concerning the law of the 
future. The prediction made in this article is one of the safest that can be made •. Indeed, it 
may be wrong to characterize what is said here as a prediction. So strong are the forces for 
the change that it may be only the details of an inevitable development that remain undis-
closed. The prediction is that American courts will abandon the principle that, absent some 
consideration other than the services to be performed, a contract of employment for an 
indefinite term is to be considered a contract terminable at will by either partY, with the 
consequences that an employer may discharge an employee for any cause, no cause, or even 
a bad cause. 
Cornelius J. Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 1 (1979); see also Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers No More: All Workers Are 
Entitled to ''Just Cause" Protection Under Title VII. 2 INDUS. REL. L.J. 519 (1978); Joseph 
Grodin, Toward a Wrongful Termination Statute for California, 42 HAsTINGS L.J. 135 (1990); 
Gary Minda & Katie R. Raab, Time for an Unjust Dismissal Statute in New York, 54 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1137 (1989); Theodore J. St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust Discharge Reform Heads 
Toward Full Flower, 67 NEB. L. REv. 56 (1988); Clyde Summers, Individual Protection Against 
Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 484 (1976) ("[T]he anachronistic legal 
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the rest of the world on this issue.9 At the other extreme, some con-
servatives, most prominently Richard Epstein, hearken back to the 
heyday of employment at will as the ideal state of employment law.10 
Such observers lament every move away from a strict presumption 
that all employment contracts can be terminated at will by either 
party. 
The fundamental problem with these perspectives is that they criti-
cize current law but they do not understand or explain it, except in the 
crudest way. The just-cause boosters simply applaud every pro-
employee decision and decry the others as backsliding responses to 
conservative political pressures. The at-will zealots simply cheer and 
boo the other way. Neither perspective appreciates the apparent vacil-
lation of current courts, which erode the at-will presumption without 
rejecting it. 
Current termination law does have an underlying coherence. We 
should recognize this coherence before we reject the contemporary 
common law system for either the Model Act's futuristic scheme of 
arbitrating just cause or a return to the heyday of employment at will. 
This paper attempts to articulate the coherence of current doctrine. 
Reacting to the almost uniform polarization on this issue, I argue both 
positively and normatively for an intermediate position. The current 
intermediate position of the common law balances two conflicting 
problems. A career-employment relationship faces two types of op-
portunism: opportunistic firings by an unfettered employer and shirk-
ing by employees with job security. An extreme legal rule can handle 
either problem alone, but only by ignoring the other. Thus, a legal 
presumption of employment at will handles the shirking problem well 
but gives no protection against opportunistic firings. A just-cause re-
gime has the opposite virtue and flaw. The legal challenge is to find an 
intermediate rule that provides the optimal check against both 
dangers. 
The common law has groped towards such a rule by recognizing 
rule that employees can be discharged for any reason or no reason should be abandoned."); Note, 
Protecting At-Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty To Terminate Only in Good 
Faith, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1816 (1980). 
9. See Samuel Estreicher, Unjust Dismissal Laws: Some Cautionary Notes, 33 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 310, 311 (1985) ("We seem to stand virtually alone among the nations of the Western industri· 
alized world in not providing general protection against unjust discharge for private-sector em· 
ployees who either cannot or do not choose unionism."). 
10. Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. Cm. L. REV. 947 (1984); 
see also Susan L. Catler, The Case Against Proposals To Eliminate the Employment At Will Rule, 
5 INDUS. REL. L.J. 471 (1983); Larry S. Larson, Why We Should Not Abandon the Presumption 
that Employment Is Terminable At-Will, 23 IDAHO L. REv. 219, 253 (1986-1987) (any presump-
tion other than at will "would only open a Pandora's box of new issues"); Richard W. Power, A 
Defense of the Employment At Will Rule, 33 DEF. L.J. 199 (1984). 
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that the relative magnitudes of the two problems vary over the life 
cycle of the worker. The danger of employer opportunism is greatest 
for late-career workers, and it is also a problem for some beginning-
career employees. By contrast, the greater problem at midcareer is 
shirking. In response, the courts have begun to offer contract protec-
tions for workers at the beginning and end of the life cycle, while 
maintaining a presumption of at-will employment for midcareer em-
ployees. In arguing for the wisdom of this approach, I, like the courts, 
refrain from making a categorical statement that at-will or just-cause 
employment should never - or should always - be the governing 
presumption. 
Let me sketch at the outset the boundaries of my inquiry. Using 
an internal-labor-markets model of career employment, this paper ex-
amines whether courts should presume, in the absence of any express 
contractual provision about job security, that an employee is at will or 
protected by just cause. This paper therefore skirts the fascinating 
contract issues involved in employee handbooks and other arguably 
express agreements about the standard of discharge. Nor will it evalu-
ate the appropriate scope of tort limitations on employment at will. 11 
The goal of this article is to articulate a coherent framework for under-
standing the default rules for employment termination. While most 
observers see chaos here, I find a certain logic in the leading cases. 
The courts have been boldest when job protection is most appropriate, 
and they have hesitated precisely when at will plays its most useful 
role. 
An initial caveat about methodology is appropriate. When apply-
ing the model to the case law, I will not survey every termination case, 
or even most or many of the thousands of cases. Rather, my method is 
to use "leading" cases - those that may indicate trends in the law -
and argue how these leading cases might fit together in a coherent 
structure. Leading cases rarely typify the mass of cases, and counter-
examples certainly exist. Leading cases are worth studying, however, 
particularly in a rapidly evolving subject area, because they often give 
greater hints about the appropriate normative structure of law than 
11. The tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy - applying more or less 
traditional concerns of tort law - attempts to protect outsiders to the employment relationship. 
See Stewart J. Schwab, Tort Limitations on At-Will Employment: Searching for Third-Party 
Effects (1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Protection of an employee fired for 
serving on jury duty provides a paradigm example. See Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (1975). By 
contrast, the contract law doctrines analyzed in this article regulate relations between employer 
and employee, regardless of whether outsiders are directly affected. Despite my sharp division 
between tort and contract limits on employment at will, I agree with Peter Linzer that the divi-
sion is often artificial. See Peter Linzer, The Decline of Assent: At-Will Employment as a Case 
Study of the Breakdown of Private Law Theory, 20 GA. L. REv. 323 (1986). 
12 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 92:8 
would an exhaustive study of the hidebound mass of cases. Neverthe-
less, because of its reliance on leading cases, my inquiry must blend 
positive and normative analysis. Perhaps the question addressed here 
should be phrased as whether the leading employment-termination 
cases can fit into a coherent structure that has normative appeal. 
One final caveat before we begin. One could argue that we should 
scrap common law litigation over employment terminations as not 
worth the cost of litigation.12 Whatever rationality the current com-
mon law lines might draw, the argument goes, its advantages are 
swamped by the costs of deciding on what side of the line a particular 
employee falls. To my mind, this litigation-cost argument is the 
strongest argument for taking a polar position. By itself, however, it 
does not point clearly toward either pole. Supporters of a rigid at-will 
presumption emphasize that fewer employees will challenge termina-
tions under their standard - thus saving on litigation costs.13 At the 
other pole, proponents of just cause, worried about the feasibility of 
courts reviewing every dismissal, typically link their proposals to arbi-
tration rather than litigation as the method of enforcement.14 In any 
event, courts themselves are poor judges of the metadecision about 
whether to have common law enforcement of employment terms. Re-
acting to the cases they see, courts have attempted to create a coherent 
doctrine. Before rejecting their efforts on grounds of cost, one should 
appreciate the balance they are trying to achieve. Until now, no one 
has attempted to find the method behind the current madness. While 
the intermediate solution of the current common law inevitably will 
have detractors on both sides, much can be said on its behalf. The 
goal of this article is to present that defense. 
I. EMPLOYMENT AS A RELATIONAL CONTRACT 
Workers have many types of jobs and many types of relationships 
with employers. Younger workers typically try several jobs before be-
ginning a long-term attachment to one employer.15 This variety of 
12. For an empirical analysis of the litigation costs, see JAMES N. DERTOUZOS, THE END OP 
EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL: LEGAL AND EcoNOMIC COSTS (1988). 
13. See Epstein, supra note 10, at 970-73 (an "enormous advantage" of the contract at will is 
that it is "very cheap to administer"). 
14. See, e.g., MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT § 6 (establishing arbitration); 
William B. Gould IV, The Idea of the Job as Property in Contemporary America: The Legal and 
Collective Bargaining Framework, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 908-10 (arguing that arbitration 
should be the "first basic ingredient" of legislation to provide just cause). 
15. See Robert E. Hall, The Importance of Lifetime Jobs in the U.S. Economy, 72 AM. EcoN. 
REv. 716, 720, 722 tbl. 3 (1982) (noting that the average worker holds 10 jobs during lifetime; 
28% of workers are currently in jobs that will last 20 years or more; 23% are in jobs that will last 
less than two years); see also John T. Addison & Alberto C. Castro, The Importance of Lifetime 
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relationships may in itself counsel against a uniform legal approach to 
employment terminations. I will return to this issue at the end of this 
article, 16 but most of my analysis will concentrate on the career em-
ployee. Termination of the career employee provides the fact pattern 
for many leading cases in the erosion of employment at will. 
A. The Specific Human-Capital Story 
The key feature of the career employment relationship is that both 
sides are locked into it. The easiest explanation for lock-in comes 
from a human-capital story that emphasizes "asset specificity."17 
Under the basic human-capital model, workers become more produc-
tive as they learn the ways of the firm. Because the gains exceed the 
costs of training, these firm-specific skills are worth learning. In con-
trast to general skills, however, these skills are not useful to other 
firms.1s 
The issue becomes whether the employer and employee can decide 
how to share the costs and benefits so that this desirable training will 
occur. This issue can be resolved in a number of ways. One possibility 
is for the employer to pay for the firm-specific training and to receive 
the benefits of the greater productivity by paying the worker through-
out his work life a wage equal to the wage he could get outside the 
firm. The problem is that the worker has no incentive to stay with the 
firm because he earns no more than he could get elsewhere, and so the 
employer risks losing the employee before it can recoup its training 
Jobs: Differences Between Union and Nonunion Workers, 40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 393, 402 
(1987) (unionized workers have longer job tenure than nonunion workers, but nonunion workers 
"enjoy considerable lifetime tenure after the job shopping years"). 
16. See infra Part V. 
17. The term asset specificity comes from Oliver E. Williamson, OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, 
THE EcONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 52-56 (1985), who calls asset specificity the most 
important dimension for transaction-cost economics - the study of the "rational economic rea-
sons for organizing some transactions one way and other transactions another." Id. at 52. As 
Williamson puts it, "asset specificity is the big locomotive to which transaction cost economics 
owes much of its predictive content." Id. at 56; see also Douglas L. Leslie, Labor Bargaining 
Units, 70 VA. L. REV. 353, 366-67 ("The key premise of the relational contract model of labor 
markets is that many job skills are learned on the job and are specific to the firm. Employees 
work in teams, and tasks are complex."). 
18. A basic conclusion of Gary Becker's classic analysis, GARY s. BECKER, HUMAN CAPI-
TAL (2d ed. 1975), is that workers rather than employers will pay for general training. If em-
ployers were to pay for training that was useful to other firms, workers after training would leave 
for other employers who, having incurred none of the training expenses, could afford higher 
wages. This is most obvious for the most general training, which is called "education." Employ-
ers rarely pay to educate workers because of the difficulty of ensuring the worker will stay for a 
reasonable length of time. Only employers like the U.S. Army, who have better means of enforc-
ing student promises to work for them later, will pay for general training. Workers also can pay 
implicitly for on-the-job general training by accepting lower wages than they would receive from 
a job that did not give them the training. 
14 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 92:8 
investment. Another possible resolution is for the worker to pay for 
the training, perhaps by accepting a lower wage during the training 
period, and for the employer to pay the worker a higher wage once 
trained. The mirror image of the earlier problem occurs in this situa-
tion: the firm has an incentive to underpay the worker once he is 
trained, and the worker has no recourse - because the training is 
worthless elsewhere - as long as he is paid at least the outside wage. 
The best solution is for the employer and worker to share both the 
costs and benefits of firm-specific training. Figure 1 gives a stylized 
FIGURE 1 
HUMAN-CAPITAL STORY 
Sharing Throughout Life Cycle 
Inside Productivity 
Inside Wage 
Outside Wage 
Training Period I YEARS AT FIRM I 
view of the situation. The outside wage is constant, equaling produc-
. tivity based on general skills. 19 In the training period at the firm, the 
worker accepts less than the outside wage, thereby paying for some of 
the training, but the employer pays him more than his productivity 
during the training period, thereby paying for some of the training. 
After training, the worker receives more than the outside wage, 
thereby reaping some of the benefits of training, but the employer does 
not pay the worker for his full productivity, thereby allowing the em-
ployer to reap some of the benefits of training. The worker will agree 
to this arrangement if the higher post-training wages, when appropri-
ately discounted, are at least as large as the lower training wages -
19. Outside productivity based on general skills remains constant because it is assumed that 
general skills remain constant over the working life. One could make the sketch more realistic by 
assuming that experience and maturity would increase outside productivity over time. Such 
complications would not further the basic insight of the model, which is that employers and 
workers share in both the costs and benefits of specific training, nor would it alter the specific 
conclusion that late-career workers receive more than the outside wage but less than their cur· 
rent productivity. 
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that is, if A' is at least as large as A. The employer will agree as long 
as the gains to it (B') are at least as large as its training costs (B). 20 
In practice, these higher post-training wages take the form of sen-
iority-based wages and late-vesting pensions, which induce workers to 
stay with the firm after training.21 Compared with the life cycle of 
otherwise similar workers, the model predicts that workers who re-
ceive substantial on-the-job training will receive higher pay in later 
years. Considerable empirical evidence supports this steep age-earn-
ings profile of career employees and its relationship to training early in 
the career. 22 
A critical part of this simple human-capital story is the self-enforc-
ing feature of the relationship. Because the parties share the costs and 
benefits of training throughout the employee's work life, both parties 
want to continue the relationship. The employer pays employees less 
than their full value later in their career. This protects employees 
from discharge because a discharge would harm the employer as well. 
The late-career wage exceeds, however, the outside wage the employee 
could receive, thereby discouraging the employee from quitting. 
B. The Efficiency-Wage Story and the Potential for Opportunism 
Gary Becker's human-capital theory23 explained why wages rise 
with seniority, but puzzles arose that caused commentators to ques-
tion the theory that workers would receive less than their value late in 
their career.24 One such puzzle was mandatory retirement, which cov-
ered some thirty-five percent of the workforce before it was prohibited 
in 1986 by amendments to the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act (ADEA).25 Why would an employer, who is paying older work-
ers less than they are worth, demand that such workers retire? A re-
lated puzzle is the presence of actuarially unfair pensions, which even 
after the 1986 ADEA amendments lawfully encourage older workers 
20. Competition among employers and employees will ensure that, in equilibrium, A=A' 
andB=B'. 
21. See RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT s. SMITH, MODERN LABOR EcoNOMICS 160-
63, 410, 425-37 (4th ed. 1991). 
22. See, e.g., James N. Brown, Why Do Wages Increase with Tenure? On-the-Job Training 
and Life-Cycle Wage Growth Observed Within Firms, 19 AM. EcoN. REv. 971 (1989). 
23. See generally BECKER, supra note 18. 
24. For a superb account of these puzzles and their impact on human-capital theory, see 
Robert M. Hutchens, Seniority, Wages and Productivity: A Turbulent Decade, J. EcoN. PERSP., 
Fall 1989, at 49. 
25. Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, § 2(c)(l), 
100 Stat. 3342, 3342 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1988)). The mandatory retirement and 
actuarially unfair pension puzzles were first discussed by Edward P. Lazear, Why Is There 
Mandatory Retirement?, 81 J. POL. EcoN. 1261 (1979). 
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to retire. The present value of many pensions declines if older workers 
keep working.26 Again, why would an employer establish pension 
plans that encourage retirement if, as the human-capital model sug-
gests, the employer makes money on older workers? A final puzzle 
stems from studies that suggest that workers' pay relative to others in 
their job grade increases with seniority but their relative productivity 
does not.27 This evidence conflicts with Becker's hypothesis that pro-
ductivity increases faster than wages. These puzzles suggest that em-
ployers want to end the relationship with late-career workers at some 
point, probably because employers perceive their wages as exceeding 
current productivity. 
To explain the puzzles, economists have developed an efficiency-
wage model.28 The basic insight behind efficiency-wage models is that 
workers often work harder when the job pays more.29 High "effi-
ciency wages"30 increase worker effort by making the job more valua-
ble to the worker. Because workers want to keep the valuable job, 
they will work hard to avoid being dismissed. In effect, high wages 
increase the penalty for being dismissed - a dismissed worker forgoes 
the large payout. Because workers labor harder than otherwise, the 
firm can afford the higher compensation. An early version of the 
26. For example, Lazear's study using 1980 data of large pension plans revealed that the 
expected present value of pension benefits was $79,476 for a worker with a salary of $25,000 and 
40 years tenure retiring at age 65, but would have been $158,225 if that same worker had retired 
10 years earlier. Edward P. Lazear, Pensions as Severance Pay, in FINANCIAL AsPBCI'S OP THE 
UNITED STATES PENSION SYSTEM 57, 72 tbl. 3.3 (Zvi Bodie & John B. Shoven eds., 1983). 
27. James L. Medoff & Katharine G. Abraham, Are Those Paid More Really More Produc-
tive? The Case of Experience, 16 J. HUM. REsOURCES 186 (1981); James L. Medoff & Katharine 
G. Abraham, Experience, Performance, and Earnings, 95 Q.J. EcoN. 703 (1980). 
28. The distinction between efficiency-wage and human-capital models is not as sharp as the 
text suggests. Variants of the human-capital model, for example, suggest that late-career workers 
may be paid more than their current productivity. See H. Lome Carmichael, Reputations in the 
Labor Market, 74 AM. EcoN. RBv. 713 (1984). For a good discussion of the distinction between 
human-capital and efficiency-wage models, see Robert Hutchens, A Test of Lazear's Theory of 
Delayed Payment Contracts, 5 J. LAB. EcoN. S153 (1987). 
29. See EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 21, at 425-26. 
30. The term efficiency wage refers to raising the wage above the level workers can earn 
elsewhere until the marginal benefit from the resulting harder work just equals the extra wage. 
Id. at 423. Economists initially applied the efficiency-wage model to developing countries. Stud-
ies showed that a higher wage could lead to greater nutrition and health, which lead to greater 
productivity. Since then, economists have used the efficiency-wage model to explain wage rigid· 
ity in the face of involuntary unemployment, a central feature of Keynesian macroeconomic 
theory. Firms will not reduce the efficiency wage even when job applicants are willing to work 
for less because full employment would increase shirking. See Carl M. Campbell III, Do Firms 
Pay Efficiency Wages? Evidence with Data at the Firm Level, 11 J. LAB. EcoN. 442 (1993) (find· 
ing evidence confirming an efficiency-wage model in which higher wages reduce turnover as well 
as induce greater productivity). See generally EPFJCJBNCY w AGE MODELS OP THE LABOR MAR· 
KET (George A. Akerlof & Janet L. Yellen eds., 1986). But see Brown, supra note 22, at 971 
(finding that most within-firm wage growth is attributable to productivity increases rather than 
to "contractual" factors). 
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model31 assumed that a firm employing this strategy32 raised wages by 
a constant amount throughout a worker's life cycle. One problem 
with the early, flat-wage version of the model is that workers nearing 
retirement would care less about losing their high-wage job and would 
therefore be less deterred from shirking. 33 
Later versions of efficiency-wage models suggest that compensa-
tion will rise over a worker's career to induce effort throughout. 34 The 
implicit contract promises large payouts for senior workers, but it 
promises this reward only for hard-working employees. 35 The firm 
recognizes that day-to-day monitoring of a worker's effort may be dif-
ficult, but over a period of years the firm hopes to spot and weed out 
shirkers. The threat of being fired before the large payoff keeps em-
ployees working hard. Because employees work harder than other-
wise, the firm can afford the higher compensation. Large law firms 
epitomize this model. 
A related literature emphasizes that firms may conduct internal 
tournaments to induce high effort by junior and midlevel management 
employees.36 Tournaments are especially likely when firms cannot 
monitor actual effort or output but can evaluate relative performance. 
A firm may (implicitly) tell an incoming class of workers that the best 
worker will win the grand prize of C.E.O. A single prize may be insuf-
ficient inducement, however, so the firm may (implicitly) offer several 
runner-up prizes of cushy vice-president jobs for those who try hard 
but fail. This model likewise suggests an implicit agreement whereby 
firms pay late-career employees more than their current productivity. 
31. Carl Shapiro & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Equz1ibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline 
Device, 74 AM. EcoN. R.Ev. 433 (1984). 
32. It has been suggested that Henry Ford's famous introduction of the five-dollar-a-day 
wage was an early example of an efficiency-wage strategy. On January 12, 1914, Ford Motor 
Company raised the wage by over 100%, from $2.34 to $5, while reducing work hours from nine 
to eight. Productivity rose so dramatically that labor costs per car rose by only 43%, material 
costs fell by 19%, and total costs per car fell 3.5%. See Daniel M.G. Raff & Lawrence Summers, 
Did Henry Ford Pay Efficiency Wages?, 5 J. LAB. EcoN. S57 (1987). The authors reject alterna-
tive explanations for the cost reductions, such as reductions in turnover or ability to hire more 
productive workers as the wage rose. 
33. Technically, the Shapiro-Stiglitz model avoids this difficulty by assuming an infinite 
working life for workers. See Shapiro & Stiglitz, supra note 31, at 435 n.5. 
34. Considerable empirical evidence documents the incentive explanation for a life-cycle rise 
in earnings. See, e.g., Hutchens, supra note 28. See generally Hutchens, supra note 24. 
35. For an excellent, nontechnical synthesis of the efficiency-wage and related literature, see 
CHRISTOPHER J. BRUCE, EcONOMICS OF EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS (1990). Bruce distin-
guishes between the basic efficiency-wage model, in which a firm raises wages above competitive 
levels for all workers, and the wage-gradation model, in which a firm initially "underpays" a 
worker but later in the career overpays the worker. See id. at 100-05. 
36. See Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor 
Contracts, 89 J. POL. EcoN. 841, 848-49 (1981); James M. Malcomson, Work Incentives, Hierar-
chy, and Internal Labor Markets, 92 J. POL. EcoN. 486 (1984). 
18 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 92:8 
Figure 2 grafts the efficiency-wage story to the human-capital 
model. As in the human-capital story, the outside wage is flat37 and 
0 
" 
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equal to outside productivity. The inside wage may be initially lower 
than the outside wage,38 but then rises. Inside productivity rises as 
job-specific training occurs. Inside productivity is above outside pro-
ductivity at all stages, even before much training, to emphasize the 
efficiency-wage story that harder work results in greater productivity 
throughout. Figure 2 adds two other wrinkles that will become im-
portant later. First, because I will specifically address the case law of 
employees who change employers, Figure 2 includes a preemployment 
"moving" period. In this stage, an employee quits the outside job and 
incurs moving expenses, thus having a negative wage. Figure 2 also 
explicitly illustrates a postretirement pension. 
37. The flatness assumption is not critical to the story. Some writers draw the outside pro-
ductivity as first increasing as the worker learns general skills and then decreasing as these skills 
atrophy. See Katherine V. Stone, Employees as Stakeholders Under State Nonshareholder Con· 
stituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. R.Ev. 45, SO (1991). A fiat curve is used here for simplicity. 
Cf. Michael L. Wachter & George M. Cohen, The Law and Economics of Collective Bargaining: 
An Introduction and Application to the Problems of Subcontracting, Partial Closure, and Reloca-
tion, 136 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 1349, 1362-63 (1988). 
38. Under the straight human-capital story, it is critical that early in the career the inside 
wage be below the outside wage because this is the worker's investment in training. Under the 
efficiency-wage story, the inside wage could be above the outside wage throughout the career if 
greater effort makes inside productivity higher throughout. 
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The critical point of the expanded story is that the implicit con-
tract is not always self-enforcing. As Figure 2 illustrates, after point 
T, firms pay late-career employees more than they currently produce. 
At this point, late-career employees become vulnerable to opportunis-
tic firing39 because the general self-interest check on arbitrary firings 
does not exist; firing such a worker does not hurt the employer but is 
instead in its immediate economic interest. One can see a role for law 
in improving this situation. By policing against opportunism, the law 
can make the employment relationship more secure for and valuable 
to both sides. To understand fully the role law can play, we must 
examine the concept of opportunism more closely. 
C. Contracting Problems in Career Employment 
One solution to the problem of opportunism is for the parties en-
tering into career employment to negotiate detailed contracts, enforce-
able by courts, that specify appropriate behavior by both sides. 
Unfortunately, three contracting challenges make detailed contracts 
an unsatisfactory solution. First, the parties cannot easily anticipate 
the future contingencies, or states of the world, that will influence the 
relationship.40 Will demand for the product stay strong? Will the 
firm shift its focus from the employee's specialty to other areas that 
require more general skills? While all predictions of the future are 
difficult, anticipating events twenty or thirty years in advance is an 
exceptional challenge for employers and employees. 
Second, even if parties can anticipate a future event, they may have 
difficulty specifying in detail the appropriate contractual response,41 
particularly when one party has access to relevant information that the 
other cannot easily observe.42 A key element in the employment rela-
tionship is whether the employee is working hard, or, from the em-
39. Some readers might think that a clear tipping point between profitable and unprofitable 
employees does not exist. Employees approaching the critical Tare less profitable to employers 
than employees earlier in their careers. Why not replace these more senior workers with junior 
workers, even before time T? Readers with this objection must implicitly adopt a model (perhaps 
based on imperfect capital markets) in which firms are prevented from undertaking all profitable 
activities open to them. If firms are not so constrained, a profit-maximizing employer would 
retain employees until age Tbefore firing them because such employees are producing more than 
their wage and therefore add to profits. Cf. Robert Hutchens, Delayed Payment Contracts and a 
Firm's Propensity to Hire Older Workers, 41. LAB. EcoN. 439, 445 (1986) ("If ... the firm faces a 
form of fixed costs, it will wait until the last possible moment to cheat on one worker and hire 
another."). 
40. Goetz and Scott call this "the problem of uncertainty in relational contracts." Charles J. 
Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1981). 
41. Goetz and Scott call this "the complexity problem of relational contracting." Id. 
42. See Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agree-
ments and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 278-79 (1992). 
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ployee's perspective, whether the employer is dismissing him for 
failure to work hard or for an unfair, opportunistic reason. When 
monitoring is difficult, two alternatives emerge. First, the parties may 
decide not to make any part of the contract contingent on difficult-to-
monitor behavior. An at-will clause would accomplish this goal by 
making worker efforts irrelevant to the permissibility of discharge. Al-
ternatively, the parties may write a vague "best efforts" or "good 
faith" clause for the contingency.43 While this solution invites later 
court or arbitrator supervision over the meaning of the terms, that 
supervision may be preferable to contractual language that straitjack-
ets parties' future options. 
Finally, having anticipated a future problem and specified the con-
tractual response, a party may be unable to prove a breach in court. 
Economists term this problem an unverifiable contract. 44 Unver-
ifiability is particularly problematic when the contractual language is 
vague - as it will often be in relational contracts. Both employer and 
employee might know that the employee is not working as hard as 
"best efforts" require, but the employer cannot assemble sufficient ob-
jective evidence to convince a court or arbitrator of this fact. If the 
parties cannot tum to outside enforcement, they must develop self-
enforcing mechanisms for any agreement to be effective. But, as we 
have seen, career-employment contracts - particularly those follow-
ing the efficiency-wage model - are not fully self-enforcing.45 
D. Potential for Opportunism 
In the absence of enforceable, detailed contracts that regulate be-
havior, parties to a long-term relationship become vulnerable to op-
portunism. They cannot easily leave the relationship because they 
would have to repeat the investments or forgo their value. 46 The exist-
ence of "sunk costs" for one party creates a potential for opportunistic 
behavior by the other side. A firm can pay workers less than they are 
worth or treat them more harshly than the initial agreement contem-
43. Goetz and Scott suggest that many parties in long-term relational contracts introduce 
vague clauses. Goetz & Scott, supra note 40, at 1092-93. Employment contracts rarely have 
such clauses, however. 
44. See Schwartz, supra note 42, at 279-80. 
45. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
46. Economists have termed the gap between the gains of the relationship and the next-best 
activity an "appropriable quasi-rent." The gap is a "rent" because it is more than the amount 
necessary to keep the worker in that job. It is only a "quasi"- rent, rather than a fixed or perma-
nent rent, because, viewed at the beginning of the employee's career, the net return including 
investment costs may be no greater than other job alternatives. The gap is "appropriable" be-
cause, after the firm-specific investments are made, one side can capture the gains for itself with-
out causing the other side to leave. 
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plated, knowing they cannot easily move. The employees can produce 
less than their skills allow, knowing the employer cannot easily replace 
them. 
The law can sometimes help monitor opportunistic behavior, 
thereby increasing the parties' overall gains from the relationship. If 
the law can enforce promises not to exploit the other side's vulnerabil-
ity, the parties can more confidently invest and the relationship will be 
more rewarding to both sides. The law has limits, however, because 
the contractual language often will be general and vague, as we have 
seen.47 More importantly, because both employer and employee are 
investing, both can be exploited. A legal rule favoring one side would 
leave much opportunism by the other unchecked. To curb opportu-
nism adequately, courts must engage in difficult, case-by-case assess-
ments or create more flexible presumptions. As we will see, courts 
have responded by adopting presumptions that vary with an em-
ployee's life cycle. 
1. Employer Vulnerability to Shirking 
As the human-capital model indicates, employers make heavy in-
vestments in recruiting and training workers.48 To ensure an adequate 
return on their investment, employers want workers to stay and pro-
duce for them after training. Some scholars focus on employer re-
cruitment and training costs in emphasizing employer vulnerability to 
employees quitting, but this is not the true problem of opportunism. 
The basic human-capital model suggests that employers can adopt 
delayed-payment schemes to discourage quitting, thus making the 
contract self-enforcing. Late-vesting pensions and seniority-based 
wages can tell workers: "If you stick around, you will do well." 
The greater risk to employers comes from employee shirking. The 
efficiency-wage model highlights the shirking problem. Even if pen-
sions and seniority wages discourage workers from quitting, an em-
ployer still faces problems when workers stay. Workers often do not 
work as hard as they would under a fully specified and monitored con-
tract. Economists label this behavior shirking.49 A fully specified op-
47. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
48. See PAUL c. WEILER, GoVERNING THE WORKPLACE 145-47 (1990). 
49. As economic labels are wont to do, the term shirking offends many workers, and the class 
of behavior economists consider as shirking is broader than the literal term shirking might imply. 
While goofing off or engaging in pranks would certainly be shirking, it also includes failure to 
think creatively about workplace problems, failure to stay current in one's area of expertise with 
personal reading, and the like. As Alan Hyde nicely puts it, shirking is the failure to make "[an] 
active contribution to improving firm productivity." Alan Hyde, In Defense of Employee Owner-
ship, 61 CH1.-KENT L. REv. 159, 183 (1991). 
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timal contract would designate an optimal level of effort. Workers 
would agree to exert this effort because they prefer the higher wages 
that accompany it to an easier work life; the employer would agree 
because the greater productivity is worth the higher wages. Once 
hired, however, an employee may shirk from this optimal effort if em-
ployers have difficulty monitoring or replacing workers. Indeed, it is 
irrational for workers to work up to "optimal" levels if they prefer 
coasting a little. Workers know that the employer will have to spend 
money to catch shirkers and that, if it fires a shirker, the employer will 
have to recruit and train a replacement. As long as workers perform 
better than a rookie would - considering the costs of monitoring, 
recruiting, and training - the firm must accept less than optimal 
efforts from its workers. 
Much of the debate over at-will employment addresses whether 
parties can write effective contracts to overcome the shirking problem. 
To put it bluntly, the real question is whether the threat of firing for 
cause is sufficient to deter substandard performance by workers. Pro-
ponents of at will emphasize the unverifiability of the performance 
standard in many employment contracts. The employer may know 
the worker is shirking but cannot convince a court or arbitrator that 
the conduct amounts to shirking. Oliver Williamson has emphasized 
the difficulty in distinguishing a consummate performance from a per-
functory performance: "Consummate cooperation is an affirmative 
job attitude whereby gaps are filled, initiative is taken, and judgment is 
exercised in an instrumental way. Perfunctory cooperation involves 
working to rules and in other respects performing in a minimally ac-
ceptable way."50 One problem employers have in documenting a "per-
functory performance" is that particular instances of misconduct often 
seem trivial. Concluding that they add up to a significant problem 
requires acknowledging that the whole problem exceeds the sum of the 
parts. The heart of the employment-at-will argument is that proving 
cause under what is essentially an unverifiable agreement against 
shirking places too great a burden on employers, preventing them 
from effectively using efficiency wages to deter shirking. 
Some may argue that commentators overstate this shirking prob-
lem because the employee's desire for a good reputation deters shirk-
ing. Even if shirking is possible in a just-cause world, this 
counterargument runs, benefits accrue to employees with a reputation 
for hard work. Not only may the incumbent employer reward hard 
work with promotions and pay raises, but employees with good repu-
so. WILLIAMSON, supra note 17, at 262-63. 
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tations are most attractive to outside employers. Nevertheless, this 
reputation argument, in both its inside and outside reputation forms, 
ignores several important facts. First, an individual worker with a 
good inside reputation may not reap major rewards. As we saw, em-
ployers often establish pay and promotion ladders that do not depend 
on current individual productivity in order to discourage quits with 
promises of big paydays in the future. si In such internal labor mar-
kets, pay scales attach to jobs rather than workers, and seniority 
rather than merit often determines who gets the jobs. s2 Promoting 
individual workers simply because of individual hard work may not be 
worth the disruptions in the general progression system. In these in-
ternal labor markets, then, unusually good effort may not be rewarded 
even though unusually bad effort is punished by firing. s3 Second, an 
employee may find it hard to acquire a good outside reputation if his 
skills are firm-specific. An academic whose publications are useful to 
many potential employers can obtain an outside reputation. Indeed, 
some might argue that the major inside job of the academic is to ac-
quire an outside reputation. An engineer working on a classified de-
fense project finds it more difficult - and therefore has less incentive 
- to obtain an outside reputation for hard work. The reluctance of 
employers to give candid references, itself a response to defamation 
law, exacerbates the difficulty for employees seeking to establish 
outside reputations. 
A second response to the shirking argument involves a quick com-
parative law lesson. In the rest of the industrialized world, at-will em-
ployment is unknown, s4 yet workers manage to work hard without the 
threat of firing.ss As Jack Beermann and Joseph Singer lament, why 
Sl. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. 
S2. This internal-labor-market model has been well depicted by Douglas Leslie: "Wage rates 
attach to particular jobs, and jobs, not workers, carry marginal products. Hirings occurs only at 
the entry level • . . . Seniority ladders control promotion, with the limitation that an employee 
may be punished if the firm discovers poor work habits." Leslie, supra note 17, at 368. For 
general discussions of the internal-labor-market model, see PETER B. DoERINGER & MICHAEL J. 
PIORE, INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS AND MANPOWER ANALYSIS 13-63 (1971); Wachter & Co-
hen, supra note 37, at 13S3-67; and Oliver E. Williamson et al., Understanding the Employment 
Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange, 6 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. SCI. 2SO (197S). 
S3. Even though the employer may not reward unusually hard workers, the employer will 
punish unusually lax workers by kicking them off the career ladder - that is, by firing them. 
Unlike sudden promotions, these terminations do not disrupt the seniority ladder for the remain-
ing workers. 
S4. See Estreicher, supra note 9, at 311; Jack Stieber, Protection Against Unfair Dismissal: A 
Comparative View, 3 CoMP. LAB. L. 229 (1980). 
SS. The point is forcefully argued by Beermann and Singer, who state: 
People in our society have come to view the world through ideological lenses that make 
them disbelieve claims that workers would be productive without the insecurity of the at-
will rule. To paraphrase Mark Kelman, it is only through a miracle, or quirky cultural 
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does our society assume it can trust employers not to abuse the power 
of arbitrary firings while it refuses to trust employees protected by just 
cause?56 Of course, one can overdramatize the comparative lesson. 
Industrial tribunals in Europe, having found a dismissal to be unjust, 
usually award modest severance pay that rarely exceeds six months 
duration.57 Further, commentators of "Eurosclerosis" would caution 
against using Europe as a model for productive labor markets.58 
Ultimately, the verifiability problem involves a question of degree, 
and the problem is greater for some jobs than for others. To the de-
gree that clear contracts against shirking are difficult to write, moni-
tor, and enforce, opportunistic behavior by employees will remain a 
threat. 
2. Employee Vulnerability 
As both the human-capital and efficiency-wage models emphasize, 
employees invest heavily as they pursue a career with a single em-
ployer. First, they obtain training that is more useful for their own 
employer than it would be elsewhere - what economists term job-
specific human capital 59 Second, they join the company's career path. 
This path, as we have seen, ties pay, promotions, and benefits to sen-
differences, that workers in the rest of the industrialized world, where the at-will rule is not 
in force, work at all. 
Jack M. Beermann & Joseph W. Singer, Baseline Questions in Legal Reasoning: The Example of 
Property in Jobs, 23 GA. L. REV. 911, 933 (1989). 
56. As Beermann and Singer put it: 
There is an irony in the assumption that owners and managers can be trusted to operate the 
business rationally while workers need insecurity to induce them to work .••• The assump-
tion that those doing the firing can be trusted with firing decisions while those being fired 
cannot be trusted to act responsibly on the job classifies those being fired as different from 
those doing the firing. Yet in many of these cases, the two parties come from the same social 
class and will have similar values. Thus, even if it were true that managers could be trusted 
and that workers could not be trusted to work hard and be productive, the prevailing as-
sumptions underlying the employment-at-will doctrine fail to explain why discharged man-
agers, as well as discharged workers, are subject to arbitrary firings. 
Beermann & Singer, supra note 55, at 934. As I suggest in the text, the explanation is not one of 
class distinctions between managers and workers, but one found in the self-bonding protection 
against arbitrary terminations. The self-interest of employers, rather than societal faith in them, 
checks arbitrary firings of productive workers. There is no equivalent self-interest check that 
deters employee shirking in the absence of employer monitoring. 
57. Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Workers' Rights: Rethinking Protective Labor Legislation, in RE-
SEARCH IN LABOR EcONOMICS 285 (Ronald G. Ehrenberg ed., 1986); Stieber, supra note 54. 
58. For an analysis of Europe's persistent unemployment problems, see Olivier J. Blanchard 
& Lawrence H. Summers, Unemployment Beyond the National Rate Hypothesis, 78 AM. EcoN. 
R.E.v., May 1988, at 182 (papers and proceedings); Richard B. Freeman, Evaluating the European 
View that the United States Has No Employment Problem, 100 AM. EcoN. AssN. PROC. 294 
(1988). For a discussion of the term Eurosclerosis, see, for example, Alan Riding, Europe In 
Turmoil, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1992, at Al; Hobart Rowen, Germany: High-Tech Laggard, 
WASH. POST, July 8, 1993, at Al7. 
59. See BECKER, supra note 18, at 18-26 (discussing specific training). 
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iority and generally forbids lateral entry.60 A major cost of pursuing a 
career with one firm is that one forgoes other ladders and must start 
over at the bottom if one leaves the firm. Additionally, as they plan 
for a lifetime with an employer, workers put down roots, establish net-
works of friends in the workplace and the community, buy homes 
within commuting distance of the job, and build emotional ties to the 
community. 
Losing these investments, roots, and ties can be devastating. Many 
studies document how even impersonal plant closings lead to increases 
in "cardiovascular deaths, suicides, mental breakdowns, alcoholism, 
ulcers, diabetes, spouse and child abuse, impaired social relationships, 
and various other diseases and abnormal conditions."61 Being singled 
out and fired may be even more devastating. 62 
Because of these tremendous costs, no employee wants to lose his 
job involuntarily. Further, these investments, roots, and ties are sunk 
costs that trap the worker in his current firm, inhibiting him from 
departing voluntarily. Even if the career does not proceed as antici-
pated, the employee is reluctant to quit because the job remains prefer-
able to alternative jobs. Such trapped workers are vulnerable to 
opportunism. The employer might pay them less than the implicit 
contract requires or work them harder, knowing they cannot easily 
quit. 
By itself, this potential for opportunism does not justify a just-
cause standard. Employers want such exploited workers to stay, not 
to leave. Only when conditions become so intolerable that the em-
ployee prefers to quit for another job might termination law come into 
play. In the economist's framework, this situation occurs when the 
employer has appropriated all the gains from the relationship, making 
the career no longer better than alternative jobs. Lawyers label these 
intolerable conditions a constructive discharge. 
Defenders of at will contend that employer self-interest protects 
productive employees from discharge. 63 An employer hurts itself by 
arbitrarily terminating a productive worker or by causing him to quit 
60. An early recognition in the legal literature of the significance of the ties, particularly 
pension and seniority protections, binding the employee to the job, is Mary Ann Glendon & 
Edward R. Lev, Changes in the Bonding of the Employment Relationship: An Essay on the New 
Property, 20 B.C. L. REv. 457, 475-83 (1979). Glendon and Lev emphasize two social trends of 
the late twentieth century: the strengthening of work ties over family ties, and the tendency for 
social standing and security to depend on workplace benefits backed up by the government rather 
than on family relationships. The inroads on employment at will, suggest Glendon and Lev, 
reflect and interact with these social trends. 
61. St. Antoine, supra note 8, at 67. 
62. Id. See generally KATHERINE S. NEWMAN, FALLING FROM GRACE (1988). 
63. See, e.g., Ehrenberg, supra note 57, at 292-93; Epstein, supra note 10, at 968. 
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because it wastes the recruiting and training investment in the em-
ployee. To avoid its own sunk-cost losses, an employer wants to keep 
good workers and fire only workers who fall below the standard of 
new entrants. Figure 1 illustrates this self-enforcing feature. After the 
training period, workers' productivity exceeds their wages, and the 
employer would lose this gain by firing such workers. 64 
While employers can make mistakes, the self-enforcing feature 
should minimize firing of productive workers. Employees do not need 
the grand and expensive apparatus of the law for further protection, 
claim at will's defenders. Indeed, its very expense harms employees as 
well as employers, for wages will inevitably fall as terminations be-
come more expensive. 
Opponents of at-will employment remain skeptical. A major con-
cern is that an employer is not a monolith but rather a hierarchy of 
high-level managers and low-level supervisors. Often low-level super-
visors make the decision to fire, and the factors influencing their deci-
sions are often not perfectly aligned with the profit-maximizing 
interest of shareholders. Thus, while shareholders may not want em-
ployees to be fired arbitrarily, supervisors might. Personality conflicts 
and power trips may lead supervisors to fire valuable and productive 
employees. 
Again, one can overstate the dangers of front-line supervisors run-
ning amok. The firm has incentives voluntarily to reduce supervisor 
mistakes so long as the gains in employee satisfaction outweigh the 
costs of supervising the supervisors. Just-cause advocates cannot 
make their point simply by showing that agency costs exist. They 
must show further that employers will not take cost-effective steps to 
ensure that they treat their employees fairly. 
One check on such opportunism - emphasized in the efficiency-
wage literature - is the employer's concern for its reputation. If word 
gets out that an employer routinely fires older workers, it will be 
harder for the employer to recruit entrants into career jobs. Perhaps 
more damaging than its outside reputation is its inside reputation with 
fellow employees when older, productive workers are fired. 6s This loss 
of collegiality may encourage other workers to quit. Problematically 
64. Even in the training period, an employer has a profit motive to retain workers. Once 
training has begun, the employer will fully recoup its investment only by keeping the worker 
until retirement. In technical terms, once training costs have begun to be sunk, the employer 
earns a quasi-rent by retaining the worker. 
65. Epstein persuasively argues that the greater reputational check against employer oppor-
tunism will be the demoralizing effect on the current workforce. Epstein, supra note 10, at 968. 
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for the employer, the most productive workers likely have the greatest 
opportwiities for moving elsewhere. 
In many situations, reputation is unlikely to check fully the em-
ployer's incentive to fire late-career workers. Young job entrants can-
not easily assess an employer's reputation for how it handles senior 
workers. 66 Great problems arise in passing on knowledge of a firm's 
opportunistic firings between generations of workers. 67 These 
problems are particularly acute in small or new firms, 68 where much of 
the workforce works. 69 Finally, a reputation for harsh personnel poli-
cies may not greatly harm decJ.iajng firms that are not hiring many 
new workers. 70 
Because reputation is not a full check on opportunism, firms must 
compensate workers for the risk that the delayed bonanza may not 
accrue. Early-career wages, or the late-career bonuses and pensions, 
must be higher than they would have to be were reputations more 
secure. Court scrutiny of opportunistic firings may offer another 
method of policing long-term contracts. Such third-party scrutiny 
may allow employers to offer efficiency-wage contracts at lower overall 
cost. The danger, of course, is that court intervention will diminish 
the employer's flexibility in firing workers whose shirking a court can-
66. See WEILER, supra note 48, at 74 ("[T]he worker who is shopping for a job will find it 
very difficult to learn (and certainly will not want to ask) about the actual dismissal risks in the 
firms being interviewed."). Weiler emphasizes the psychological tendency to underestimate the 
dangers of low-probability, high-cost events such as being fired. Id. 
67. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 17, at 406-07. For a mathematical model of the role of 
reputation in labor markets, suggesting that reputation by itself will not enforce efficient behavior 
by firms, see Carmichael, supra note 28. 
68. For an argument linking firm size to reputation, see Donald Parsons, The Employment 
Relationship: Job Attachment, Work Effort, and the Nature of Contracts, in 2 HANDBOOK OF 
LABOR EcONOMICS 789, 800-01 (Orley Ashenfelter & Richard Layard eds., 1986). The basic 
point is that even a "bad" small firm may have too few terminations for an outsider to detect a 
general pattern. 
69. BUREAU OF THE CENsus, U.S. DEPT. OF CoMMERCE, STATisrICAL AilsTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: 1992, at 526, tbl. 837 (!12th ed. 1992) (indicating that 24% of workers -
excluding government, railroad, self-employed, and other categories - work for firms of fewer 
than 20 workers, and that another 26.8% work for firms of 20 to 99 workers); see also Nancy E. 
Dowd, Maternity Leave: Taking Sex Differences into Account, 54 FORDHAM L. REv. 699, 711 
(1986) (indicating that almost 40% of all employees work for businesses with fewer than 50 
employees). 
70. Some have argued that new management coming in after a corporate takeover might 
breach implicit contracts with impunity, doing such things as terminating pension plans that 
were the prize for working hard early in the life cycle. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable Coali-
tions: Corporate Governance as a Multi-Player Game, 78 GEO. L.J. 1495, 1521-28 (1990); Andrei 
Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKE-
OVERS: CAUSES AND CoNSEQUENCES 33 (Alan J. Auerback ed., 1988). This possibility is a 
further risk employees take in relying on reputation to ensure employers will not behave oppor-
tunistically at the end of the life cycle. The empirical importance of this motive in corporate 
takeovers has been questioned by Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, 
and Regulation, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 119 (1992). 
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not verify. The question is whether court intervention can be limited 
to opportunistic firings, rather than to a broader supervision against 
unfair firings in general. 
II. AN (INCONCLUSIVE) APPEAL TO EMPIRICISM 
We see, then, that both the employer and employee are vulnerable 
to opportunism. Which is the greater problem - shirking or unjust 
firings? Or, more precisely, what legal rule can best reduce the 
problems? The choice is highly political. Those sympathetic to work-
ers will feel their exploitation is the greater problem and favor just-
cause. Others who instinctively rely on private markets may see a 
greater need to curb worker shirking and so favor at will. 
Some scholars have looked at actual practices to help resolve the 
debate. 71 It is useful to sketch these appeals to empiricism before re-
jecting them as inconclusive and moving to the life-cycle theory of 
career employment. 
A. The Pervasiveness of At-Will Employment 
Certainly, at-will employment is the legal norm for the vast major-
ity of American workers. As a long-repeated practice by many players 
negotiating many contracts, at-will employment is a plausible candi-
date for being the optimal arrangement, in the sense that the overall 
gains, which primarily accrue to the employer, outweigh the costs of 
potentially arbitrary firings, which are borne primarily by employees. 
Both sides can share this net gain by increasing the wage to compen-
sate workers for the risk of firing. Richard Epstein uses this empirical 
observation to bolster his argument for the desirability of at-will em-
ployment: "The survival of the contract at will, and the frequency of 
its use in private markets, might well be taken as a sign of its suitabil-
ity for employment relations. "72 
The empirical claim that most private employees are at will is 
rarely disputed. 73 One needs some faith in the efficiency of labor mar-
kets, however, to infer that this proves that at-will employment is effi.-
71. An extensive inquiry by Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, Just Cause for Termination 
Rules and Economic Efficiency, 38 EMORY L.J. 1097 (1989), concludes that a mandatory tenure 
system is less efficient than an at-will rule. 
72. Epstein, supra note 10, at 948. Epstein concedes that employment at will has been in 
retreat in the common law but does not suggest that this weakens his empirical claim that sur-
vival implies suitability. 
73. One recent survey of employment practices suggests, however, that perhaps 20% of non-
union employers offer grievance procedures leading to arbitration. JOHN DELANEY BT AL., 
HUMAN RBsOURCB POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN AMERICAN FIRMS tbl. 26 (1989). Certainly, 
many employee handbooks contain limitations on at-will dismissal, and the courts are increas-
ingly enforcing these handbooks. Thus, while clearly true until recently, the blanket statement 
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cient, in the sense that the costs to employers from a switch to just 
cause would outweigh the gains to workers. Unequal-bargaining-
power theorists are unlikely to have such faith. 
The noted institutional economist John Commons put it well long 
ago in disputing the claim that the employer and the at-will employee 
have equal freedom to quit the relationship: 
If the corporation has 10,000 employees it loses only one ten thousandth 
part of its working force if it chooses to not-employ the man, and cannot 
find an alternative man. But the man loses 100 per cent of his job if he 
chooses to not-work and cannot find an alternative employer. 74 
Commons's observation envisions an employer with market power, 
perhaps a monopsonist or even a company town. Even a monopsonist, 
however, would not insist on at-will employment if it harmed employ-
ees more than it helped the monopsonist. A monopsonist can increase 
its profits by offering cost-effective fringe benefits because employees 
would agree to work for a lower wage. 75 If employers had unlimited 
bargaining power, an employer would only pay workers a subsistence 
wage. 76 This does not accord with the reality of the labor market for 
most American workers. 
In any event, the monopsony model is inapt. Most employees to-
day have alternative job options, 77 at least at the beginning of a rela-
tionship, which limits the monopsony power of employers. If at will 
presents a serious danger of exploitation and beginning employees see 
the danger, they will require higher wages before they accept the dan-
ger. Refusing to concede that workers will receive benefits for which 
that private nonunion employees overwhelmingly are subject to dismissal at will needs some 
qualifications today. 
74. JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 72 (1924). 
75. This argument breaks down for workers near the minimum wage, who legally cannot 
agree to work for lower wages even if they would receive greater job security in return. 
76. Epstein makes a similar argument. He writes~ 
Indeed if such an inequality did govern the employment relationship, we should expect to 
see conditions that exist in no labor market. Wages should be driven to zero, for no matter 
what their previous level, the employer could use his (inexhaustible) bargaining power to 
reduce them further, until the zero level was reached. Similarly, inequality of bargaining 
power implies that the employee will be bound for a term while the employer (who can pay 
the peppercorn consideration) retains the power to terminate at will. Yet in practice we 
observe both positive wages and employees with the right to quit at will. 
Epstein, supra note 10, at 973. Peter Linzer makes a nice rebuttal to Epstein's point. "That 
workers got some of the greatly enlarged pie .•. is hardly proof that they would not have got 
more if they had had a stronger bargaining position. That they are not reduced to slavery or 
starvation is no proof that they are not exploited." Linzer, supra note 11, at 415. Still, Linzer 
refuses to make operational his concept of unequal bargaining power with a coherent theory of 
what it means, and in particular what its limits are, arguing instead that Epstein's theory can fall 
of its own weight because it is "based on fantasy or unproved assumptions." Id. 
77. See EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 21, at 78 ("Examples of pure monopsony in the 
labor market are difficult to cite •... "). Ehrenberg and Smith cite articles suggesting that the 
market for nurses in a small town with one hospital may be partially monopsonized. Id. 
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they are willing to pay, unequal-bargaining-power enthusiasts shift 
their argument away from the existence of a monopoly to the absence 
of real bargaining. Even if workers have several entry-level job op-
tions, the argument runs, workers have no real choice because every 
employer offers at-will employment on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. 
Duncan Kennedy, hardly an unabashed enthusiast of the economics 
vision, provides the best response to this argument. 78 As Kennedy re-
alizes, one cannot test whether buyers as a class influence compensa-
tion packages by studying whether individuals dicker over terms. 79 
The analogous argument would be that consumers have no influence 
over breakfast cereals because they cannot bargain with the grocery 
store manager over the terms of sale. so 
Of course, as I have been emphasizing, both employer and em-
ployee gain more from the long-term relationship than they would by 
starting over with others. This relationship surplus must be divided 
between them. There is no clear theory or evidence about how the 
parties should divide the surplus.8 I Importantly, though, even an em-
ployer who captures most of the surplus has an incentive to promise 
just-cause terminations if that is the efficient promise. The fact that we 
virtually never see employers make such promises is some indication 
that at will is the efficient relationship, especially when at will is sup-
ported by a plausible model of its efficiency. 
B. The Unionized Just-Cause Standard as Countelfact 
Rather than resort to inequality of bargaining power to refute the 
78. Duncan Kennedy provides the best general critique on inequality of bargaining power as 
a coherent justification for market intervention. Recognizing that unequal bargaining power is a 
phrase of many meanings, Kennedy finds several subtests: 
[T]he industry is "public"; the terms were drafted by the seller and offered on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis; the seller is a bigger entity than the buyer; the sellers have monopoly power in 
the relevant market; the commodity in question is a necessity; and there is a shortage which 
permits sellers to exploit buyers. 
Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special 
Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 Mo. L. RBv. 563, 616 
(1982). Kennedy finds all of these subtests inadequate, even ifthe goal behind them is to help the 
weak at the expense of the strong. In the text I concentrate on the monopoly power and take-it-
or-leave-it subtests. 
79. As Kennedy explains: 
There may be no bargaining because bargaining is expensive, and buyers as a group are 
unwilling to pay the increased cost of individualized transactions. Further, in a truly com-
petitive market, no one gets to negotiate terms with anyone else. You can't argue that 
market power skews bargains and then object in those very situations where, because of 
competition, no one gets any individualized say at all. 
Kennedy, supra note 78, at 616. 
80. See WEILER, supra note 48, at 17. 
81. Epstein gives several arguments to explain why either the employer or the employee 
might obtain most of the surplus. Epstein suspects that the surplus would be divided more or 
less evenly. Epstein, supra note 10, at 975-76. 
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significance of at will's pervasiveness, a weightier rebuttal82 empha-
sizes that the just-cause standard always governs terminations among 
unionized workers. 83 Free-market proponents might attempt a quick 
dismissal of this fact by saying that unions distort the market; one 
cannot expect the unionized market to reflect efficiency.84 But this 
response is too hasty. 
The competitive market may reflect the preferences of marginal 
workers, but it does not necessarily reflect the wishes of inframarginal 
workers. 85 In a competitive labor market, employers learn how to 
structure their employment package from the ease with which they fill 
positions. They rely, in other wor:ds, on signals from workers they are 
trying to recruit, or workers who are deciding whether to quit. If 
these workers do not reflect the interests of inframarginal workers, the 
competitive market will not reach an efficient result. 
The inframarginal workers - the career employees upon whom 
we have been focusing - are locked in. They have made significant 
investments in the workplace and cannot easily leave. In a competi-
tive market that relies on exit and entry to register preferences, locked-
in employees will not be included in the calculus. This is not a prob-
lem unless their preferences differ in some dimension from the prefer-
ences of marginal workers less tied to the firm. It is quite plausible, 
however, that the average worker has significantly greater preference 
for job security than does the marginal worker. The marginal worker 
is typically young and in the process of trying out several jobs before 
82. Professor Weiler makes an excellent argument against at-will employment along these 
lines. WEILER, supra note 48, at 71-78. 
83. Another major sector in which just-cause protection is the norm is the public sector. One 
explanation for this phenomenon might be the greater need of public employees for protection 
from arbitrary dismissal because the usual self-monitoring features against firing productive 
workers are muted for government employers. As public choice theorists emphasize, the goal of 
government employers may not be productive workers but workers willing to use the power of 
government to favor the latest election winners. Another explanation for just-cause protection of 
public employees is that, when political factors make it difficult for government employers to give 
highly visible wage increases, they increase compensation less obviously through fnnge benefits, 
including job protection. 
The other major area in which just cause is the predominant standard is for the university. A 
possible explanation for the existence of tenured university employees is the divergence between 
the overall social good in promoting a vigorous debate on ideas - which requires some debaters 
with wacky, unpopular, or unpleasant views, and often the personalities to match - and the 
local institutional goals that include not only college prestige but also collegiality. By granting 
tenure, the college binds itself to ignore the local costs in unpleasantness from tolerating an 
employee pursuing unpopular, unpleasant views. Colleges can afford to take this larger view of 
the common good because they are either nonprofit organizations or publicly subsidized. 
84. This approach is reflected in Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. 
CHI. L. REv. 988, 1000 (1984) ("Although some empirical support has been marshaled for this 
productivity-enhancement theory of unionization, the theory is extremely hard to accept."). 
85. See WEILER, supra note 48, at 76; Leslie, supra note 17, at 358. 
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finally settling on a firm with which to establish a career. 86 This mar-
ginal worker may not recognize or value fully the firm's reputation for 
job security and may not realize that he may one day be locked into a 
career with this firm. 87 
In short, termination standards from the nonunion market, re-
sponding largely to the exit of young workers, may not reflect the ag-
gregate costs and benefits as well as the union collective-choice 
mechanism, which reflects the preferences of average workers. On the 
other hand, also unwarranted is the bolder statement that the collec-
tive choice outcome is clearly a superior way of toting up the costs and 
benefits. As with many analyses, showing the flaws of a market mech-
anism does not, by itself, demonstrate the superiority of other solu-
tions. In this case the problems with union median-voter solutions are 
well known. 88 
Ultimately, then, an appeal to empiricism cannot provide a univer-
sal answer to whether at will or just cause is the optimal standard. 
Each standard has costs and benefits, and the balance may shift de-
pending on the situation. Those who debate the issue too frequently 
ask whether at will or just cause should be the presumption in all em-
ployment relationships. A universal answer cannot be found. The 
next section attempts to break down the inquiry into parts of the life 
cycle, and to explain the inherent logic of the common law solution. 
III. LEGAL SUPERVISION OF OPPORTUNISTIC FIRINGS 
It is time to examine the employment termination cases. In ex-
plaining the common law approach, I will first show that courts have 
attempted to police opportunistic firings by employers. I will then at-
tempt to fit their efforts into the efficiency-wage framework. 
A. Ad Hoc Judicial Scrutiny of Employer Opportunism 
A party to a long-term relationship is most vulnerable to opportu-
nism when the party has substantially performed while the other side 
has not. 89 The other side, having received most of its benefit, has an 
86. See Hall, supra note 15, for evidence that young workers try out several jobs and then 
tend to have a long relationship with one employer. 
87. See WEILER, supra note 48, at 75-76. 
88. See BARRY T. HIRSCH & JOHN T. ADDISON, THE EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF UNIONS 23-
29 (1986), for a discussion that the median-voter solution may not provide a more efficient out-
come than a competitive-market solution, even when average and marginal workers differ in their 
preferences for job security. 
89. As Epstein writes: 
[C]ontract at will works only where performance on both sides takes place in lockstep pro-
gression. This condition will be satisfied where neither side has performed or where the 
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incentive to terminate the relationship to avoid paying out its side of 
the bargain. Contract doctrine generally imposes a duty of good faith 
upon parties, in part to protect against such opportunistic behavior. 
Section 1-203 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), for exam-
ple, mandates good faith in . commercial transactions. 90 While good 
faith defies simple definition,91 for our purposes an appropriate mean-
ing is that a party to the contract cannot deprive the other party of the 
benefit of the bargain.92 
Courts have hesitated in imposing a generalized good-faith stan-
dard upon at-will employment relationships. The courts fear that a 
nebulous legal standard will make the delicate relationship too rigid or 
legalistic.93 Nevertheless, some courts have made good-faith inroads 
worker's past performance has been matched by appropriate payment from the em-
ployer. . . • Where the sequence of performance requires one side to perform in full before 
the other side begins performance, this bonding mechanism will break down because there 
are no longer two unperformed promises of roughly equal value to stand as security for each 
other. 
Epstein, supra note 10, at 979. 
90. U.C.C. § 1-203, 1 U.L.A. 109 (1989) states: "Every contract or duty within this Act 
imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement." U.C.C. § 1-102(3), 1 
U.L.A. 12 (1989), while generally allowing the parties to waive U.C.C. provisions, forbids parties 
from disclaiming the obligation of good faith, although it allows the parties to determine the 
standards by which to measure good faith, if "not manifestly unreasonable." 
91. Professor Robert Summers insists that good faith cannot be defined. As he writes: 
rro ask what good faith means] misconceives good faith. Good faith, as judges generally use 
the term in matters contractual, is best understood as an "excluder'' - a phrase with no 
general meaning or meanings of its own. Instead, it functions to rule out many different 
forms of bad faith. It is hard to get this point across to persons used to thinking that every 
word must have one or more general meanings of its own - must be either univocal or 
ambiguous . 
• • • In most cases the party acting in bad faith frustrates the justified expectations of 
another •.•• rrJhe ways in which he may do this are numerous and radically diverse. More-
over, whether an aggrieved party's expectations are justified must inevitably vary with at-
tendant circumstances. For these reasons it is not fruitful to try to generalize further. It is 
easy enough to formulate examples of bad faith and work from them. Besides, any general 
definition of good faith, if not vacuous, is sure to be unduly restrictive, especially if cast in 
statutory form. 
Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195, 262-63 (1968). 
92. Cf 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CoNTRAcrs § 7.17a (1990) (detailing 
the history of attempts to define "good faith" and offering alternatives to the definition in the 
text). Professor Lillard has described the benefit-of-the-bargain definition as the most popular 
definition of good faith in employment law cases. See Monique C. Lillard, Fifty Jurisdictions in 
Search of a Standard: The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in the Employment Context, 
57 Mo. L. REV. 1233, 1249 (1992). 
93. See, e.g., Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., 479 A.2d 781, 789 (Conn. 1984) ("We decline the 
invitation of plaintiff to transform the requirement of good faith into an implied condition that an 
employee be dismissed only for good cause. To hold otherwise would render the court a bargain-
ing agent for every employee not protected by statute or collective bargaining agreement."); 
Pamar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 629 (Haw. 1982) (implying "a duty to terminate 
in good faith would seem to subject each discharge to judicial incursions into the amorphous 
concept of good faith. We are not persuaded that protection of employees requires such an 
intrusion on the employment relationship or such an imposition on the courts."); Moriss v. Cole-
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on at-will employment. Although the courts rarely articulate it in 
these terms, they tend to make these inroads when investment asym-
metries make the employee particularly vulnerable to opportunistic 
firings. 
A leading example of a good-faith inroad is Fortune v. National 
Cash Register Co., 94 in which the court imposed a good-faith limita-
tion on an employer's ability to fire a salesperson about to receive a 
commission. Orville Fortune was a salesperson under a written at-will 
contract that entitled him to a bonus for equipment orders placed in 
his territory and an additional bonus when the equipment was in-
stalled in his territory. One day after Fortune signed a $5 million or-
der, National Cash Register (NCR) fired him, depriving him of the 
installation part of the commission.95 The Massachusetts Supreme Ju-
dicial Court, in upholding a jury verdict for Fortune, recognized that 
NCR had paid Fortune all the bonus to which he was entitled under 
the express contract. The court found NCR had breached, however, 
an implied covenant to act in good faith. 96 
Richard Epstein has attacked the Fortune decision as "wrong in 
principle."97 He points to the important fact that NCR did not keep 
the disputed commission for itself, but rather paid it to an installations 
employee.98 Epstein argues, therefore, that "[t]he case is not simply 
one where a strategically timed firing allowed the company to deprive 
a dismissed employee of the benefits due him upon completion of per-
man, 738 P.2d 841, 851 (Kan. 1987) ("[T]he principle of law stated in Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 2-5, that every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing in its performance and its enforcement, is overly broad and should not be applicable to em-
ployment-at-will contracts); Melnick v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 1105, 1111 (N.M.) 
("Employers are entitled to be motivated by and serve their own legitimate business interests 
• • • • Protection of employees does not require such a restriction on an employer's discretion in 
managing his work force or such an imposition on the courts."), cert denied, 488 U.S. 822 
(1988); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1086-67 (Wash. 1984) (arguing that a 
good-faith exception would result in unwarranted judicial intrusion into each discharge decision 
and that "such an intrusion into the employment relationship is merely a judicial substitute for 
collective bargaining which is more appropriately left to the legislative process"). For an excel-
lent SO-state survey of good-faith employment-termination cases, see Lillard, supra note 92. 
94. 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977). For an analysis of the Fortune case similar to mine, see 
WEILER, supra note 48, at 67. 
95. 364 N.E.2d at 1254. After discussing the "firing" with his branch manager, Fortune was 
allowed to stay in a "sales support" position until the employer ultimately fired him 18 months 
later. Fortune received his order bonus commission for machines delivered over the next 18 
months, but he was denied the delivery bonus. He received neither the order or delivery bonus 
for machines delivered after his ultimate firing. While these developments after the initial "fir-
ing" complicate the story, the basic point remains true that NCR fired Fortune after he had done 
the work on the sale but before he could reap the full commission for his efforts. 
96. 364 N.E.2d at 1255-56. 
97. Epstein, supra note 10, at 981-82. 
98. Id. at 981. The court, but not Epstein, notes that paying an installations employee de-
parted from NCR's usual policy of paying bonuses only to salespeople. 364 N.E.2d at 1254. 
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formance."99 Rather, "[t]he contractual provisions concerning com-
missions represent a rough effort to match payment with performance 
where the labor of more than one individual was necessary to close the 
sale."100 
We should heed Epstein's waining against applying the good-faith 
principle without carefully considering the incentive and bonding de-
vices the parties have created. Perhaps the Fortune decision is wrong 
in application. By paying all of the commission to some employee or 
other, the company avoided the temptation of an opportunistic termi-
nation. But the Fortune case is not wrong in principle. The valid prin-
ciple, for which Fortune is usually read to stand, is that courts should 
scrutinize opportunistic firings in which the employee has largely per-
formed his side of the bargain but has yet to reap his reward. Sales-
people on commission are classic examples of persons who can find 
themselves in that situation. 
Another classic example of a good-faith analysis occurs when an 
employer fires an employee shortly before he qualifies for a pension. 
Again, the usual self-interest check on an employer's decision to fire a 
productive employee is missing. An employer can save itself consider-
able money by exercising its at-will discretion just before a pension 
vests. A routine practice of firing all employees before their pensions 
vest might have severe reputation costs. But the occasional firing for 
this reason might be less damaging. The issue arose in Ingersoll-Rand 
Co. v. McClendon, 101 in which an employee with nine and three-
quarters years of service was fired four months before his pension was 
to vest. Such a firing clearly violates the good-faith notion that an 
employer must give the employee the benefit of the bargained-for pen-
sion. The Texas Supreme Court allowed a common law tort action for 
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The U.S. Supreme 
Court did not disagree with the underlying rationale but reversed the 
Texas Supreme Court. It held that the employee must bring this claim 
under section 510 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(BRISA), which clearly prohibits an employer from discharging a 
worker "for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right 
to which [the worker] may become entitled under the [pension] 
plan."102 
99. Epstein, supra note 10, at 981. 
100. Id. 
101. lll s. Ct. 478 (1990). 
102. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988), quoted in 111 S. Ct. at 485; see also Hazen Paper Co. v. Big-
gins, 113 S. Ct. 1701, 1707 (1993) (to "fire an employee in order to prevent his pension benefits 
from vesting •.. is actionable under§ 510 ofERISA"). 
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Employer opportunism can occasionally surface when a worker 
quits rather than is fired. Again, the law must decide whether to regu-
late opportunism. An example is Jordan v. Duff and Phelps, Inc., 103 a 
well-known case due to the disagreement between two law-and-eco-
nomics-oriented judges about the application of the good-faith duty to 
employment at will. The majority opinion by Judge Easterbrook em-
phasized that courts should scrutinize situations in which opportu-
nism is a danger. Jordan was an at-will employee of a close 
corporation who acquired one percent of the company's stock as part 
of his compensation plan. When Jordan resigned, he sold his stock for 
book value, as required under the plan. The company's chairman ac-
cepted his resignation without telling him of a possible merger that 
would increase his share's value from $23,000 to over $600,000. When 
Jordan learned of the merger, he filed a lOb-5 action alleging fraud in 
the purchase of corporate securities.104 The majority opinion by Judge 
Easterbrook reversed a summary judgment for the employer, distin-
guishing between an employer who is "thoughtless, nasty, and mis-
taken" from one who engages in "[a]vowedly opportunistic 
conduct."105 While the employer perhaps could have fired Jordan for 
any reason, 106 reasoned Judge Easterbrook, it could not cash out the 
stock option on the eve of its appreciation.1°7 Judge Posner, in dissent, 
noted that "the possibility that corporations will exploit their junior 
executives . . . may well be the least urgent problem facing our na-
tion." 108 Judge Posner argued that business executives would rather 
rely on their employer's good will and interest in reputation, and on 
their own bargaining power, than "pay for contract rights that are 
difficult and costly to enforce."109 
Although leading examples of recent trends, the cases discussed so 
far do not illustrate the general hesitancy of courts to adopt an across-
103. 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987). 
104. 815 F.2d at 432-33. 
105. 815 F.2d at 438. 
106. In the actual case, Jordan resigned rather than was fired. The issue was whether a close 
corporation owes a duty to inform a shareholder-employee of the possible merger. But, if the 
closely held corporation-employer could fire Jordan for any reason, including a desire to capture 
the pending price rise on stock owned by Jordan, then it would have no duty to inform Jordan of 
the possible merger. The pivotal issue in the case thus becomes whether Jordan could be fired for 
this reason. 
107. Judge Easterbrook imagined a little note from the employer: " 'There will be a lucrative 
merger tomorrow. You have been a wonderful employee, but in order to keep the proceeds of 
the merger for ourselves, we are letting you go, effective this instant. Here is the $23,000 for your 
shares.' " Judge Easterbrook said the court did not "suppose for a second" that the firm could 
fire an employee for this reason. 815 F.2d at 439. 
108. 815 F.2d at 449 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
109. 815 F.2d at 448. 
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the-board good-faith standard for termination of employment. This 
hesitancy is clearest in New York, where the highest court has de-
clared that any good-faith requirement is inconsistent with employ-
ment at will. In Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 110 a 
company fired an accountant after he told top management that cor-
porate officers had illegally manipulated the accounts of secret pension 
reserves. Conceding he was an at-will employee, Murphy complained 
that the employer breached the covenant of good faith by firing him 
simply for doing his job - which was, after all, to disclose accounting 
improprieties. The court of appeals rejected his claim, reasoning that 
the good-faith covenant was inconsistent with the employer's unfet-
tered right to terminate employment at any time.111 
The Murphy holding is consistent with the asymmetric-investment 
rationale for policing terminations. Admittedly, Murphy was between 
a rock and a hard place: be fired for being a poor internal auditor or 
be fired for being a vigorous internal auditor. The firing seems arbi-
trary and unfair, but it is not an example of employer opportunism.112 
The company will suffer if it wrongly chooses to smooth internal poli-
tics at the cost of chilling vigorous internal audits. Society suffers no 
injury other than that borne by the company.113 Because the dangers 
of contract opportunism and third-party effects are absent, courts do 
not need to police the situation. To intervene in a situation like Mur-
phy would leave no room for employment at will. 
Even in Massachusetts, from which the seminal Fortune 114 case on 
good faith originated, courts have been careful to limit good-faith pro-
tection to situations of asymmetric investments. An employee has no 
110. 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983). 
111. 448 N.E.2d at 89-90. 
112. The court recounted in the facts that Murphy had 23 years of service and was 59 years 
old when fired. 488 N.E.2d at 87. As I explain below, infra section 111.B.1, courts should be 
sensitive to the exploitation claims of long-term employees. But the Murphy court nowhere used 
the length of tenure in its analysis of his age discrimination claim, although it reversed the lower 
court's dismissal on statute of limitation grounds. 488 N.E.2d at 93. Gary Minda reports that 
Murphy lost his age discrimination claim after a 10 day jury trial in 1988. A decade after his 
firing he was still in litigation. See Gary Minda, Employment Law, 42 SYRACUSE L. REv. 491, 
493 n.8 (1991). 
113. Murphy also brought a tort claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. 
488 N.E.2d at 90-91. The court emphatically denied the existence of such a cause of action. 
Such an extreme view is, in my judgment, unwise because the tort action is needed to control 
third-party effects of terminations. See Schwab, supra note 11. My point here is that the good-
faith rationale, which requires one to allow the other party the benefit of the bargain, does not 
help Murphy. Other courts have equated the good-faith obligation with the tort of wrongful 
discharge in violation of public policy. See, e.g., Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 
834, 840-41 (Wis. 1983). This is likewise an unwise limitation on the good-faith doctrine. The 
tort claim focuses on third-party effects, but the good-faith claim regulates opportunistic conduct 
between the parties, even if no one other than the employer and employee are directly affected. 
114. 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977). 
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claim for a "bad faith" termination unless the employer intended "to 
benefit financially at the [employee's] expense, such as for the purpose 
of retaining for itself sales commissions or pension benefits which 
would otherwise be due to the [employee]."115 For example, in one 
case employees sued when the employer changed its evaluation policy 
to a "Bell Curve," thus assuring that some employees would receive 
low ratings and be constructively discharged.116 The Supreme Judicial 
Court found no violation of the good-faith standard, reasoning that 
the employees were merely complaining they had lost the opportunity 
for "future compensation for future services" 117 rather than being de-
nied compensation "specifically related to a particular past service."118 
Only the latter termination is a form of opportunism, whereby the em-
ployer is firing an employee who has largely performed his side of the 
bargain without receiving benefits. 
B. Regulating Opportunism Over the Life Cycle 
These cases represent classic but ad hoc examples of courts pro-
tecting employees against opportunistic terminations. In Fortune an 
employee was fired before a commission came due. In Ingersoll-Rand 
an employee was fired before a pension vested. In Jordan an employer 
repurchased a terminated employee's stock just before it enormously 
increased in value. One can easily justify legal intervention on good-
faith grounds. Employees can invest in the relationship more freely, 
making the relationship more valuable to both sides, when courts are 
available to ensure that employers will not exploit their investments. 
Likewise, Murphy illustrates the limits of a good-faith analysis. With-
out the potential for opportunism, courts should be reluctant to inter-
cede in the relationship. 
Unfortunately, an ad hoc "opportunism" test is unsatisfying for 
several reasons. Courts may have difficulty identifying opportunism 
when they see it. Even if courts can identify opportunism after the 
fact, an ad hoc test gives limited prospective guidance to employers 
and employees. Finally, the amorphous nature of an ad hoc opportu-
115. Siles v. Travenol Lab., Inc., 433 N.E.2d 103, 106 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982) (affirming judg-
ment for employer notwithstanding jury verdict for $250,000). The court also declared that a 
"bad faith" termination claim would arise if the employer's reason for the discharge was contrary 
to public policy. Siles, 433 N.E.2d at 106. Such public policy claims are essentially based on tort 
principles. As stated earlier, they are beyond the scope of this article. See supra text accompany-
ing note 11. 
116. McCone v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 471N.E.2d47 (Mass. 1984). 
117. McCone, 471 N.E.2d at 50 (quoting Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 461 N.E.2d 796, 
798 (Mass. 1984)). 
118. McCone, 471 N.E.2d at 50. 
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nism test may mean it becomes so broadly applied that it is indistin-
guishable from a just-cause requirement for all terminations. This 
would weaken the deterrence of employee shirking - the prime ra-
tionale for employment at will. 
If we recall the life cycle of the career employee, we can identify a 
more systematic pattern of legal intervention. Over the life cycle of a 
career employee, a sequence of possibilities for opportunism exists. A 
career employee is particularly vulnerable to opportunism at the be-
ginning and end of his career. By contrast, employers are especially 
vulnerable to opportunism at the employee's midcareer. The cases 
suggest that courts are sensitive to this life cycle. Courts are most 
likely to scrutinize firings at the beginning and end of the life cycle. 
Courts do not get involved during midcareer unless they see an obvi-
ous case of particular opportunism, such as a firing before a pension 
vests or a sales commission is due. 
1. Beginning-Career Opportunism 
Employees face a risk of opportunistic termination at the begin-
ning of the life cycle. The risk arises because employees commit irre-
trievable investments to the relationship before the employer does. 119 
Usually the beginning-career cases involve employees who have moved 
to take a job or quit another job in reliance on a job offer. 
Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc. 120 provides an example of a 
court protecting a beginning-career employee from opportunistic ter-
mination. A drugstore pharmacist resigned with two weeks notice in 
reliance on a job offer from a health clinic. When he called to begin 
work at the clinic, however, the employer told him that it had filled 
the position. The pharmacist was unemployed for some time. The 
court allowed the employee to recover under a promissory estoppel 
theory.121 It determined that the employee had reasonably relied on 
the job offer and that justice required that the court hold the employer 
to its promise. The employer had argued it would be incongruous to 
119. Figure 2 illustrates how early-career employees may make investments before the em-
ployer does. An employee starting his career may incur relocation costs. Further, the beginning 
wage may be lower than the wage he could get elsewhere and lower than his productivity, which 
is another form of asymmetric investment by the employee. I should note that a beginning wage 
below the alternative wage is not an essential feature of the efficiency-wage model and is often 
contrary to fact. 
120. 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981). 
121. The court explicitly relied on § 90 of the Restatement of Contracts, which states: "A 
promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance ... on the 
part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can 
be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." REsTATEMENT OF CoNTRACTS § 90 (1932), 
quoted in Grouse, 306 N.W.2d at 116. 
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provide a remedy for firing someone the day before work begins when 
the employee, being at will, would have no remedy for being fired the 
day after work began. The court agreed that such a result would be 
incongruous, but it resolved this contradiction by suggesting that an 
employee might also have a reliance claim if the employer fired him 
shortly after beginning work. 
Other courts have used a theory of additional consideration to give 
employees who moved to a new job a reasonable time to recoup their 
investment before being arbitrarily dismissed. While many courts 
hold that merely working is insufficient consideration to make a just-
cause promise enforceable, some additional detriment to the employee 
or benefit to the employer may lead to an enforceable promise. In 
Veno v. Meredith, 122 for example, a newspaper fired an editor eight 
years after he quit a prior job and moved from Newark to Penn-
sylvania to accept a position. The court, citing Corbin on Contracts, 123 
declared that an employer could not arbitrarily discharge an employee 
for a reasonable time commensurate with the hardship the employee 
had endured.124 The court upheld a directed verdict against the em-
ployee, however, declaring that after eight years the reasonable length 
of time "ha[d] surely passed."12s In denying the employee's claim, the 
court distinguished a prior case that upheld an employee's verdict for 
breach of a "permanent" employment contract when he was fired 
three days into a job after moving from New York to Philadelphia.126 
Some courts have held that relocating or leaving secure jobs is evi-
dence that the parties must have agreed on a fixed-term contract 
rather than at-will employment. In Lanier v. Alenco, 127 a worker 
"with a wife and four children[ ] left a secure and well-paying position 
with General Electric, a position that he had held for eleven years," to 
122. 515 A.2d 571 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986), appeal denied, 616 A.2d 986 (Pa. 1992). 
123. 3A ARTHUR A. CoRBIN, CoRBIN ON CoNTRACTS § 684 (1960). 
124. In the words of the court: 
When sufficient additional consideration is present, an employee should not be subject to 
discharge without just cause for a reasonable time. The length of time during which it 
would be unreasonable to terminate, without just cause, an employee who has given addi· 
tional consideration should be commensurate with the hardship the employee has endured 
or the benefit he has bestowed. 
515 A.2d at 580 (citations omitted). 
125. 515 A.2d at 580 n.4. 
126. Lucacher v. Kerson, 45 A.2d 245 (Pa. Super. Ct.), ajfd., 48 A.2d 857 (Pa. 1946). Lu-
cacher found a breach of a valid "permanent" contract of employment. Veno suggested the 
Lucacher court should have found the promise of permanent employment to be too vague to be a 
valid contract. Instead, said the Veno court, the Lucacher court should have "inferred a contract 
for a reasonable length of time based solely on the sufficient additional consideration." 515 A.2d 
at 580 n.4. 
127. 459 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1972) (applying Louisiana law). 
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take a new job.128 The court found it "unlikely" that the worker 
would have left without substantial assurances of job security, and it 
held that this fact corroborated evidence of a fixed one-year 
contract. 129 
Similarly, in Miller v. Community Discount Centers, Inc., 130 a 
worker left his family in Toledo and moved to Chicago after he re-
ceived a letter from his new employer stating he had "a rewarding and 
satisfying career ahead of [him]" and confirming the employer would 
pay one-half of his moving expenses immediately and the balance after 
one year. 131 The employer dismissed the worker after three months. 
The court upheld his claim for breach of a definite one-year contract, 
finding it "inconceivable that a man of plaintiff's age would leave his 
home to come to Chicago for the mere possibility that he would have a 
permanent position."132 
We see, then, that courts sometimes allow claims by beginning-
career employees who are arbitrarily fired after moving or quitting a 
prior job.133 Some courts use a promissory estoppel or reliance theory, 
some find an implied contract for a reasonable time to allow the em-
ployee to recoup his expenses, and some simply use the decision to 
move or to quit as evidence of an actual definite-term agreement. Re-
gardless of the theory for recovery, one can explain these cases as at-
tempts to regulate opportunistic firings early in the life cycle. 
Employers have not yet invested in the relationship and thus are not 
hurt if they arbitrarily dismiss the new employee. This means that the 
relationship is not self-enforcing, as it is when both parties have in-
curred sunk costs. 
Nevertheless, protection for beginning-career employees is far 
from universal. Many or even most courts refuse to find that reliance 
on an at-will job offer is reasonable.134 In these cases, an employee 
128. 459 F.2d at 692. 
129. Louisiana is one of the few states without a statute of frauds requirement that contracts 
that cannot be completed within a year must be in writing. Instead, Louisiana requires that oral 
contracts with greater than $500 value be proved by corroborating circumstances. The issue in 
Lanier was whether quitting the prior job could be a corroborating circumstance. 
130. 228 N.E.2d 113 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967). 
131. 228 N.E.2d at 114·15. 
132. 228 N.E.2d at 115. The opinion never reveals the employee's age. 
133. In addition to the cases discussed in text, see Cashdollar v. Mercy Hosp., 595 A.2d 70 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (holding that a professional moving his pregnant wife and child to a differ· 
ent state and leaving a job paying $82,000 annually creates sufficient hardship to protect against 
at·will firing). 
134. Representative examples of cases refusing to uphold opportunism claims of early-career 
employees include: Ferreyra v. E.&J. Gallo Winery, 41 Cal. Rptr. 819 (Ct. App. 1964); Schoen 
v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 243 N.E.2d 31 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968); and Romack v. Public Serv. Co., 
499 N.E.2d 768 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986), revd., 511 N.E.2d 1024 (Ind. 1987). In Ferreyra, an 
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quits another job or moves to a new job at his own risk. 
The ambivalence of courts in this area is understandable. For at 
least three reasons, the opportunistic termination rationale for protect-
ing employees is weaker in these beginning-career cases than it is later 
in the life cycle. First, very often the employer also makes substantial 
investments early in the relationship. Recruiting and training new em-
ployees can be a major cost to many firms. As Paul Weiler describes 
recruiting costs: 
The recruiting process itself imposes significant costs on the firm; not 
merely on the personnel department, which must do the initial advertis-
ing and screening, but also on the operating divisions, which must inter-
view and judge the suitability of candidates. The magnitude of these 
costs can vary widely, depending on the nature of the job, the skills re-
quired, the number of applicants, and so on, but on occasion they can be 
substantial indeed.135 
One study estimated that a typical firm spends 160 hours in hiring and 
training a new worker in the first three months on the job, and that 
these costs are nearly thirty percent of the value of an experienced 
coworker during the three-month period.136 If the employer as well as 
the employee sustain heavy early costs, the risk of opportunistic termi-
nation is smaller. An employer that arbitrarily or unjustifiably fires an 
employee hurts itself as well, for it wastes the expenses of recruiting. 
Second, even if recruiting costs are insignificant - as they will be 
in many cases - so that arbitrarily firing the employee does not penal-
ize the employer, the employer gains nothing from firing a person 
early in his career. Thus, while employees often suffer no penalty from 
an arbitrary beginning-career firing, they gain no benefit from them 
either. This fact distinguishes beginning-career from late-career fir-
ings, in which the employer can gain from firing employees whom it 
pays more than their current output. 
Argentinian worker gave up his job and moved his family to the United States to become a crew 
boss of a Gallo pruning and irrigation crew. The court held this was not sufficient consideration 
to protect against firing without cause. In Schoen, Caterpillar told the employee he must quit his 
present job to work for Caterpillar. The court held that the employee might still be fired at will 
because his quitting did not create sufficient consideration to make the new employment contract 
binding. Finally, in Romack, a police captain with 25 years of experience left a permanent posi-
tion to take a job as a security manager. He also sold his old house to buy a new one within the 
community at his new employer's request. The court held that the captain was not protected 
against at-will firing. 
135. WEILER, supra note 48, at 146. Weiler cites a study by Daniel J.B. Mitchell & Larry J. 
Kimbell, Labor Market Contracts and Inflation, in WORKERS, JOBS, AND INFLATION (Martin N. 
Baily ed., 1982), which reports that a 1979 survey of Los Angeles employers found that recruit-
ment and initial training costs ranged from over $2000 for each office worker to over $3500 for 
production workers to over $10,000 for salary-exempt workers. WEILER, supra note 41, at 146 
n.26. · 
136. See EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 21, at 142-44 (citing sources). 
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A final problem with job protection for new employees is that em-
ployers often need a probationary period to sort out hiring mistakes, 
wherein they can fire employees without explanation or extensive doc-
umentation of their reasons. Relevant here is the fact that competitive 
firms, largely responding to the entry and exit of early-career employ-
ees, virtually always contract for at-will dismissal. 137 Even the Model 
Employment Termination Act, which calls for general good-cause 
protection for employees, refuses to protect employees with less than a 
year of service.13s 
In sum, in many situations employer opportunism against begin-
ning employees is either a trivial threat or outweighed by legitimate 
needs to maintain employer flexibility. In these situations, courts do 
not scrutinize the sudden termination. Still, the potential for opportu-
nistic employer offers is real. An employer engages in opportunistic 
behavior when it hires a better person before training anyone but after 
the first job applicant has relied on the offer. Courts protect beginning 
employees from such opportunism. 
2. Late-Career Opportunism 
Late-career employees face the greatest danger of opportunistic :fir-
ings. At the end of their life cycle, they often earn more than their 
current productivity. If they do, the employer has a financial incentive 
to terminate them, even if it violates an implicit promise to allow the 
employee to reap the rewards of hard work earlier in his career. 
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act provides one check 
against late-career opportunism. By prohibiting employers from firing 
workers above the age of forty because of their age, the ADEA pro-
tects older workers from discharges based upon stereotypes that lead 
employers to underestimate their productivity. "We need new blood" 
and "Doe is slowing down a notch" are classic statements that create 
age discrimination lawsuits. 
However, the ADEA may offer only limited protection against the 
central concern of the life-cycle model - opportunistic firings when 
salary and forthcoming benefits outweigh current productivity. In 
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 139 the Supreme Court unanimously held 
that an employer did not violate the ADEA when it fired a sixty-two-
137. See supra Part II. 
138. Section 3(b) of the Model Employment Termination Act states that the good-cause pro-
tections "appl[y] only to an employee who has been· employed by the same employer for a total 
period of one year or more and has worked for the employer for at least 520 hours during the 26 
weeks next preceding the termination." MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION Acr, 7A U.L.A. 
74 (Supp. 1993). 
139. 113 s. Ct. 1701 (1993). 
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year-old employee just before his tenth anniversary with the company 
in order to keep his pension benefits from vesting. Although the Court 
agreed that the firing was actionable under section 510 of BRISA, it 
held "that an employer does not violate the ADEA just by interfering 
with an older employee's pension benefits that would have vested by 
virtue of the employee's years of service."140 Justice O'Connor, writ-
ing for the Court, emphasized that age is not the same as years of 
service.141 "The ADEA only requires an employer to ignore an em-
ployee's age; it does not specify further characteristics that an em-
ployer must also ignore."142 Under the life-cycle model, the employee 
becomes vulnerable to opportunism with years of service, not with age. 
The ADEA is therefore of little help. 
A recent Second Circuit case, consistent with but not cited in Ha-
zen Paper, shows even more clearly the limitations of the ADEA in 
protecting workers from late-career opportunistic firings. In Bay v. 
Times Mi"or Magazines, Inc., 143 a fifty-four-year-old publisher who 
made nearly $200,000 per year brought an ADEA claim after being 
fired from his position at Field and Stream. The employee thought he 
had a "smoking gun" when he produced an internal memorandum 
from the company's chairman stating that the employee's salary alone 
mandated his dismissal. The employee asserted the memo established 
his "high salary was a critical factor in the decision," and that the high 
salary was "a direct function of his longevity, experience, seniority or 
periodic salary raises."144 The Second Circuit, without disputing these 
assertions, affirmed summary judgment for the employer. Conceding 
that "high salary and age may be related," the court declared that 
"nothing in the ADEA ... prohibits an employer from making em-
ployment decisions that relate an employee's salary to contemporane-
ous market conditions ... and concluding that a particular employee's 
salary is too high."145 
Other cases interpret the ADEA more expansively. In Metz v. 
Transit Mix, Inc., 146 for example, the Seventh Circuit reversed a trial 
court judgment for an employer who had replaced a fifty-four-year-
old, highly paid manager with a younger, cheaper colleague. The 
court emphasized that an employer cannot assess the costs of employ-
140. Hazen, 113 S. Ct. at 1707-08. 
141. 113 S. Ct. at 1707. 
142. 113 S. Ct. at 1707. 
143. 936 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1991). 
144. 936 F.2d at 117. 
145. 936 F.2d at 117. 
146. 828 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1987). 
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ing an older worker when deciding whom to terminate because pay is 
a "'proxy' for age."147 Under this interpretation, which received an 
enigmatic citation from the Supreme Court in Hazen. 148 the ADEA 
protects older workers fired because their salary exceeds current pro-
ductivity. Because of the close connection between a worker's age and 
time he spends with the company, the ADEA indirectly protects late-
career employees as well. 
Greater protection may come from common law courts, which in 
recent years have begun policing opportunistic firings of late-career 
employees.149 The leading case is Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 150 in 
which a thirty-two-year employee was abruptly fired after working his 
way up from dishwasher to corporate vice president. The employee 
never had a clear agreement about job security, although managers 
had given him encouraging evaluations over the years. 151 The court 
held that this career pattern, including the length of service and the 
policies and practices of the company, could establish an implied-in-
fact promise against arbitrary dismissal. 152 Pugh epitomizes the effi-
147. 828 F.2d at 1208. Judge Easterbrook, in dissent, emphasized that pay is only a rough 
proxy for age except in the rare cases in which a firm uses a lock-step compensation system based 
on age. 828 F.2d at 1220. Easterbrook noted that another situation in which pay could differ 
from current productivity was with firms using life-cycle implicit contracts whereby employees 
would be paid less than productivity early in their career and more than current productivity late 
in their career. 828 F.2d at 1220-21. This is precisely the model analyzed in this article. Easter-
brook recognized the potential for employer opportunism in this situation and suggested the 
ADEA might provide a remedy based on a disparate impact approach. 828 F.2d at 1221. 
148. In Hazen, the Supreme Court did not preclude the possibility that the ADEA protects 
workers from an employer who fires workers with a certain pension status as a "proxy" for age, 
in the sense that the employer may suppose a correlation between the two factors and act on the 
basis of pension status to get at age. The court then gave a "cf." citation to Metz, saying that the 
case used" 'proxy' to mean statutory equivalence." Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701, 
1707 (1993). It is unclear what degree of support this signals for the Metz case. 
149. For an excellent discussion of the various legal theories by which courts uphold job 
security based on longevity of service, see Linzer, supra note 11, at 354-68, 383-86. 
150. 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Ct. App. 1981). 
151. As the court described it: 
When Pugh first went to work for See's, Ed Peck, then president and general manager, 
frequently told him: "if you are loyal to (See's) and do a good job, your future is secure." 
[The company's president] had a practice of not terminating administrative personnel except 
for good cause • . • . During the entire period of his employment, there had been no formal 
or written criticism of Pugh's work. 
171 Cal. Rptr. at 919. Some read these statements as amounting to a company policy of just 
cause and categorize the case that way. See Linzer, supra note 11, at 345-55. I find the state-
ments so general that almost any long-term employee could supply proof of similar assurances. 
The critical feature of Pugh is not these assurances, but the longevity of his tenure. Linzer does 
not disagree. Id. at 367. 
152. The appellate court therefore reversed the trial court's dismissal at the end of the plain-
tiff's case and remanded for a second trial. At the second trial, the jury found for the employer, 
and the judgment was upheld on appeal. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 250 Cal. Rptr. 195 (Ct. 
App. 1988). Thus, the employee whose case symbolizes court protection of late-career workers 
himself ultimately was fired without legal protection. 
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ciency-wage story and its end-game dangers. Pugh committed himself 
to a single firm, worked hard to gain promotions to the promised easy 
life, but then was terminated. Pugh also demonstrates the effect of the 
arrival of new management on job security. In Pugh, new manage-
ment arrived a year before Pugh's firing. Such major corporate 
changes may diminish the reputational check on firings of late-career 
employees. 
Length of service is the key element that motivates courts to scruti-
nize a late-career firing. Most opinions, like Pugh, also examine oral 
statements and the company's general procedures. But a Montana 
case, Flanigan v. Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association, 153 
starkly illustrates the centrality oflongevity. In that case, a bank fired 
Mildred Flanigan without notice or a hearing after twenty-eight years 
of service. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed a nearly $1.5 mil-
lion judgment for Flanigan, declaring that her "28 years of employ-
ment by Prudential gave her a secure and objective basis for believing 
tp.at, if her work was satisfactorily performed, her employment would 
continue."154 In its decision, the court quoted extensively from a Cali-
fornia appellate case, Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 155 which also 
emphasized longevity of service as a key element of a bad faith claim. 
In Cleary, the court upheld a claim brought by an employee dismissed 
without cause after eighteen years of service. The court declared that 
"[t]ermination of employment without legal cause after such a period 
of time offends the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing contained in all contracts including employment contracts."156 
Occasionally, an employee faces the danger of beginning-career 
and late-career opportunism at the same time. This situation occurs 
when a long-time employee agrees to a job transfer. A prominent ex-
ample is Foley v. Community Oil Co., 157 in which a thirty-year em-
ployee was fired three years after accepting a job transfer to another 
state. The court's explicit rationale in finding the employee had stated 
a claim tracks the life-cycle theory. The court first noted that "up-
rooting and moving a family" could give rise to a contractual claim.158 
The court then declared that "[l]ongevity of service can also give rise 
to an implied contract right."159 Tracking the lock-in problem with 
153. 720 P.2d 257 (Mont. 1986). 
154. 720 P.2d at 262. 
155. 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Ct. App. 1980). 
156. 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729. 
157. 64 F.R.D. 561 (D.N.H. 1974) (applying New Hampshire law). 
158. 64 F.R.D. at 563. 
159. 64 F.R.D. at 563. 
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which we have wrestled, the court explained that "[t]he employee, in 
providing long-term employment to a single employer substantially di-
minishes his economic mobility."160 
In sum, one can explain these cases as attempts to monitor and 
enforce the implicit life-cycle employment contract. Late in an em-
ployee's career, the usual checks against opportunistic firings unravel. 
Courts enter to monitor the bargain. The bargain does not give late-
career employees complete job security. They can be dismissed for 
cause, because otherwise the shirking problems would be immense, but 
the employer does not prove cause simply by proving that salary ex-
ceeds current productivity. That is the typical life-cycle pattern that 
both sides to career employment anticipate and, ex ante, it is in the 
interests of both sides. 
3. Midcareer Shirking 
Once the employer has begun to make substantial, asset-specific 
investments in an employee, the risk of arbitrary firing diminishes. 
The greater danger of opportunistic behavior - at least, behavior that 
an appropriate dismissal standard could limit - comes from the em-
ployee's side. Because the employer does not want to repeat recruiting 
and training costs with another employee, the incumbent employee 
has an opportunity to shirk without fear of dismissal. Shirking at mid-
career can occur even if the employer has the right to dismiss at will, 
but the shirking problem can be exacerbated if the employer must also 
surmount the hurdle of proving just cause. 
This is not to say that the employer cannot exploit the midcareer 
employee. Indeed, as I emphasized above, 161 being trapped by invest-
ments in firm-specific capital and in community roots can make a mid-
career employee ripe for exploitation. But the exploitation will not 
take the form of firing because the employer is making money from the 
relationship. Rather than fire a midcareer employee, an employer may 
pay him less than would be called for under a fair division of the gains 
from the long-term relationship or make his workload or working con-
ditions more onerous. Just cause cannot protect the midcareer em-
ployee from these abuses. Better, then, for the law to focus on 
something it can handle, which is deterrence of shirking by midcareer 
employees. 
The courts seem to have intuited this fact by refusing, in general, 
to create contract protections against arbitrary terminations for mid-
160. 64 F.R.D. at 563. 
161. See supra notes 59·60 and accompanying text. 
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career workers. Midcareer employees have made the fewest contribu-
tions to the doctrinal erosion of at-will employment. •62 
The most detailed data on wrongful termination plaintiffs come 
from a Rand study163 of120 California jury trials164 in the early 1980s. 
Over half the plaintiffs in this sample were early-career employees, 
with :five or fewer years of job tenure.165 Nearly a quarter of the plain-
tiffs had over :fifteen years of tenure, 166 with the remaining quarter of 
the plaintiffs being midcareer employees with six to fifteen years ten-
ure.167 This sample of jury trials suggests that midcareer employees 
are a minority of wrongful termination plaintiffs, and many of these 
may be bringing public policy and other tort claims not inconsistent 
with the life-cycle model.16s 
The leading cases also suggest to some extent the courts' reluc-
tance to protect midcareer employees. One case that typifies this hesi-
tation is Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co. 169 The case is especially 
significant because Michigan courts have been leaders in eroding the 
at-will presumption. In Rowe, a salesperson with eight-years tenure 
was :fired for leaving the store one day without explanation. The em-
ployee sued, claiming she had been orally told she would have a job as 
long as she met her sales quota, and pointing out that when she was 
hired she had signed a "Rules of Personal Conduct" that enumerated 
only four reasons - all involving theft, dishonesty, or immorality -
162. Of course, it is hard to demonstrate convincingly a negative statement like "cases of this 
type rarely occur," especially when the methodology is to examine "leading" cases rather than 
systematically to examine all reported cases. Counterexamples do exist. In the text I discuss 
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988), the most prominent counterexample. 
Still, I remain convinced as a positive matter that courts are not inclined to scrutinize termina-
tions of midcareer employees, and the life-cycle model suggests the wisdom of their hesitation as 
a normative matter. 
163. See generally ]AMES N. DERTOUZOS ET AL., THE LEGAL AND EcONOMIC CONSE-
QUENCES OF WRONGFUL TERMINATION (1988). 
164. The sample of 120 wrongful termination jury trials in California between 1980 and the 
first quarter of 1986 includes perhaps 65 to 70% of all wrongful termination trials in California 
during that time. Id. at 19 & n.1. One must Use extreme caution in extrapolating from facts 
about tried cases to statements about all cases, including settled cases. Tried cases are likely to be 
a biased sample of all cases. See generally George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of 
Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984); Stewart J. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, 
Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: The Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the 
Government as Defendant, 13 CoRNELL L. REv. 719 (1988). 
165. Some 18.2% of all plaintiffs had under one year of tenure, and another 34.2% had one 
to five years of tenure. DERTOUZOS ET AL., supra note 163, at 21 tbl. 4. 
166. Id. (the precise number is 23.1%). 
167. Some 15.7% of the plaintiffs had 6 to 10 years of tenure, and only 8.3% of the plaintiffs 
had 11 to 15 years of tenure. Id. 
168. By contrast, according to the 1980 census, only 14.5% of workers had worked 15 or 
more years in their current jobs, while 60.1 % had worked five or fewer years. See Robert E. 
Hall, The Importance of Lifetime Jobs in the U.S. Economy, 22 AM. EcoN. REV. 716, 717 (1982). 
169. 473 N.W.2d 268 (Mich. 1991). 
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for immediate discharge. The· Michigan Supreme Court denied her 
claim,170 emphasizing that the words of assurance were "more akin to 
stating a policy"171 than offering an express contract, and noting that 
nothing in Montgomery Ward's "Rules of Personal Conduct" sug-
gested that the enumerated conduct was the only basis for dismissal.172 
The Rowe court distinguished Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield, 173 a leading employee-rights case, by emphasizing that Tous-
saint involved actual negotiations over job security by high-level em-
ployees.174 Rowe evoked a spirited dissent by the author of Toussaint, 
who insisted that an enforceable promise was equally present for the 
low-level salesperson.17s 
The Court in Rowe did not rely heavily on her moderate job tenure 
but simply disallowed her claim because it found the circumstances 
were insufficient to infer an implied-in-fact contract.176 One can only 
speculate that the court would have viewed Rowe's claim more sym-
pathetically if she had thirty-years tenure rather than eight. Under the 
life-cycle model, the case would be dramatically different if Rowe had 
been a late-career employee. 
The most prominent counterexample to my claim about midcareer 
employees not receiving protection is Foley v. Interactive Data Corp, 177 
in which the California Supreme Court upheld an implied-in-fact con-
tract claim as well as an implied-in-law breach of good-faith claim 
brought by an employee who served the company just six years and 
nine months before he was terminated. The Foley case is remarkable 
for at least two reasons. First, and ironically, most commentators 
view the decision as a dramatic cutback on employee rights because 
the court refused to grant tort damages for employees claiming a 
breach of the covenant of good faith. Second, and more pertinent to 
our analysis, Foley pushes the limits for defining a "late-career" em-
ployee. Basing an employee's just-cause claim on less than seven years 
of service cannot realistically be viewed as an attempt to deter oppor-
tunistic firing of late-career employees whose seniority-based earnings 
outrun their current productivity .178 Indeed, the court recognized 
170. The Court reversed a trial court judgment on a jury verdict of $86,500 plus interest. 
473 N.W.2d at 281. 
171. 473 N.W.2d at 275. 
172. 473 N.W.2d at 275. 
173. 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980). 
174. 473 N.W.2d at 274. 
175. 473 N.W.2d at 289-308 (Levin, i., dissenting). 
176. 473 N.W.2d 273-75. 
177. 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988). 
178. When discharged in 1983, Foley was a branch manager in a Los Angeles subsidiary of 
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that short tenure might weaken Foley's implied contract claim.179 It 
emphasized, however, three additional factors: (1) Foley alleged 
(rather vague) oral assurances of job security and consistent promo-
tions and salary increases;180 (2) Foley alleged breach of written "Ter-
mination Guidelines" that suggested self-imposed limitations on the 
employer's right to terminate employees;181 and, (3) unlike Pugh, Fo-
ley had "supplied the company valuable and separate consideration" 
by signing a promise not to compete against the employer for one year 
after termination.182 Many employees can allege the first two factors. 
The third factor is less common, although far from unique. Perhaps 
these other elements explain why Foley is not consistent with the gen-
eral claim that courts rely on longevity of service and scrutinize only 
late-career terminations for opportunism. More realistically, Foley 
probably reflects a general move in California toward a good-faith 
standard for all terminations.183 
In summary, my argument is that the general pattern of good-faith 
and implied-contract cases reflects an intuitive understanding by the 
courts that employees are subject to opportunistic discharge at the 
end, and less consistently at the beginning, of the life cycle. Courts are 
reluctant, however, to give general protection against arbitrary dismis-
sal to midcareer employees. The economic self-interest of employers 
should keep such dismissals in check. The greater concern is with em-
ployee shirking. 
To clarify the distinction I draw between scrutinizing opportunis-
tic late-career terminations and scrutinizing all employment decisions 
under a just-cause standard, let me return to the facts of Murphy v. 
American Home Products. 184 Murphy, like the California Foley, was 
an internal whistleblower who reported to upper management wrong-
doing by immediate supervisors.185 While bucking the corporate hier-
Chase Manhattan Bank that markets computer-based decision-support services, making an an-
nual salary of$56,164. In addition, as the court points out, he received a $6762 merit bonus two 
days before his discharge. 765 P.2d at 375. The court's opinion never mentions Foley's age. 
Based on these characteristics, it seems hard to characterize Foley as anything but a midcareer 
employee. 
179. 765 P.2d at 377-78. 
180. 765 P.2d at 383, 388. 
181. 765 P.2d at 388. 
182. 765 P.2d at 388. 
183. The court several times declared that it was not disturbing the general at-will presump-
tion, see, e.g., 765 P.2d at 384, which indeed is codified in CAL. LAB. CODE§ 2922 (West 1989). 
It simply held that the parties had reached a contrary implied agreement in this case. 765 P.2d at 
383. 
184. 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983). 
185. Foley had informed a company vice president that Foley's immediate supervisor was 
under investigation by the FBI for embezzling from his prior employer. After Foley was fired, 
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archy often gets employees into trouble, courts are hesitant to referee 
the resulting turf fights. 186 Internal whistleblowing resembles too 
closely legitimate, but practically unverifiable, concerns that an em-
ployee is not a team player or that an employee creates difficulty in the 
office. Legal limning of these situations is probably not worth the 
costs. 
Thus, I would have greater sympathy for Murphy if he claimed 
that he was fired after twenty-three years of service187 because he was 
no longer pulling his weight or earning his salary. Unless the parties 
have clearly agreed to at-will dismissals throughout the life cycle, such 
a firing smacks of an employer opportunistically firing an employee 
who has committed the best years of his life and should reap, based on 
the norms of seniority, the benefits of a career commitment to the em-
ployer. In fact, Murphy did claim age discrimination- a claim that 
was still being litigated a decade after his discharge.188 But a legiti-
mate defense might be that opportunism had nothing to do with the 
termination; he was fired because he attempted to buck the corporate 
system. Of course, when an employer fires an older worker allegedly 
for such a reason, the proof problems in sorting out the real reason for 
discharge are enormous. This dilemma quite likely will make employ-
ers wary of firing older workers. My point, in short, is that just-cause 
protection should be limited to an inquiry into whether the employee 
was fired in breach of the life-cycle commitment to pay seniority-based 
wages and benefits or for other opportunistic reasons. 
IV. DEFAULT RULES 
"Aren't we done now?" the dear reader might ask. Not quite. We 
have seen that a life-cycle rule may be the best way for employer and 
employee to minimize the dangers of opportunism on each side of the 
employment relationship. One might still argue, however, that parties 
seeking this arrangement should put an explicit life-cycle rule in the 
contract. If they do not, courts should presume the contract is at will 
the supervisor pled guilty in federal court to a felony count of embezzlement. 765 P.2d at 375 
n.13. 
186. I do see a valid role for legal scrutiny, in a tort guise, of terminations that may adversely 
affect public policy. Firing a whistleblower of illegal corporate acts often fits this category. See 
Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 164. 
187. The court in Murphy recounts in the facts that he had 23 years of service with his 
employer, 448 N.E.2d at 87, but nowhere uses his longevity in its analysis. The court also notes 
that Murphy was 59 years old when he was discharged and overturns the lower court's dismissal, 
on statute of limitations grounds, of his age discrimination claim. 448 N.E.2d at 92-93. 
188. See Minda, supra note 112, at 493 n.8 (indicating that, although Murphy lost a subse-
quent trial on the age discrimination claim, the case was reversed and remanded upon appeal and 
is awaiting retrial). 
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or just cause. The final step in my argument, then, explains why the 
life-cycle rule should be the default rule for courts, even though the 
parties could choose any rule by explicit contract. 
A. Minimizing Transaction Costs 
The traditional law-and-economics literature on default rules sug-
gests that courts do and should choose rules that minimize transaction 
costs. Two sometimes conflicting tests come from this approach. 
First and most prominent is the "mimic the market" or "would have 
wanted" test, whereby courts supply the default contract term that 
most parties would put in the contract were they bargaining without 
costs and with full information. This test saves most parties from the 
costs of acquiring information and bargaining over the term. The 
trick in applying this test is to determine which rule maximizes joint 
gains by helping one party more than it hurts the other. In general, a 
complex default rule is likely to "mimic the market" better than a 
simple rule, in that parties who were bargaining costlessly would prob-
ably agree to share risk and minimize opportunism on both side. The 
second test, the "~prove bargaining that occurs" approach, urges a 
default rule that lowers costs for those who must bargain rather than 
allows most parties to avoid bargaining.189 A simple, clear default rule 
may be easier for the parties to bargain around, and it may thus lower 
transaction costs for parties who will actually bargain over the partic-
ular term.190 
Luckily, in our situation both tests point in the same direction.191 
189. See Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1982). 
190. Mark Kelman has noted this ambivalence in law and economics between rules that 
lower bargaining costs and rules that mimic the market. He finds that clear rules are generally 
favored under the first criterion and complex rules under the second. See MARK KELMAN, A 
GUIDE TO CRmCAL LEGAL STUDIES 123-24 (1987). 
191. Scholars recently have proposed an alternative criterion for default rules. Labeled "pen-
alty default" rules or "information-forcing" default rules, these default rules are designed to be so 
onerous that one party will want to write around it, in the process revealing information that 
allows for a superior bargain. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Con-
tracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE LJ. 87, 91 (1989); Ian Ayres & Robert 
Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 
729 (1992); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, Information and the Scope of Liability for 
Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 7 J.L. EcoN. & ORGANIZATION 284 
(1991); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Principle of Hadley v. Baxendale, 80 CAL. L. REV. 563 (1992); 
Jason S. Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 
YALE L.J. 615 (1990). Applied to our context, unfortunately, the penalty default model does not 
point definitely to either just cause or at will, and the model does not work at all when a third 
alternative such as a life-cycle default is possible. For example, suppose that at will is the effi-
cient contract for most workers. The few job applicants for whom just cause is appropriate 
cannot risk being labeled a shirker by requesting just cause. The model might suggest that just 
cause should be the default, forcing employers - who arguably are not penalized by being la-
beled an arbitrary, unfair employer - to insist on an at-will clause. But because employers 
probably are penalized by a reputation for unfairness, an at-will default might be needed to keep 
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First, under the would-have-wanted default test, our previous analysis 
suggests that a life-cycle termination standard would be optimal for 
most career employees; by minimizing opportunism on both sides, it 
allows for the most productive relationship. Because it maximizes the 
overall gains to the relationship, most parties bargaining under low 
transaction costs would opt for the life-cycle rule. 
Second, the lower-bargaining-costs approach also favors a life-cy-
cle default rule because it is easier for parties to bargain away from 
than toward the life-cycle rule. At-will clauses are easy to compose.192 
Just-cause clauses are also straightforward to write, although the 
phrase ·~ust cause" is a rich and complex term of art in labor arbitra-
tion.193 In Professor Rose's marvelous terminology, these are "crys-
tal" rules.194 By contrast, a life-cycle rule would be hard to draft 
because it would be difficult to specify at the outset of a relationship 
exactly when the relative vulnerability switches from employer to em-
ployee. Rose would call the life cycle a "muddy" rule. 195 The parties 
cannot easily articulate at the time of initial hire the proper governing 
structure for their future relationship. They may prefer to rely on 
courts' often bumbling and instinctive judgment about relative vulner-
abilities. Under the life-cycle default, parties can simply say nothing 
too explicit in the contract and count on courts to apply the life-cycle 
approach. In short, the parties can easily draft away from a life-cycle 
default if they choose, but they cannot easily draft away from an at-
will or just-cause presumption toward a life-cycle rule. 
Indeed, the ambiguity in the timing of a life-cycle default rule may 
be itself desirable. Suppose a contract explicitly called for at-will em-
"good" at-will employers from being lumped together with bad ones. The formal penalty default 
model requires that a majority of contracts clearly favor one rule. See Bebchuk & Shavell, supra, 
at 292 & n.22 (emphasizing that the fraction of high valuation buyers determines whether limited 
or unlimited liability is the optimal rule). As discussed supra in Part II, it is unclear whether the 
optimal termination clause in most cases would be at will or just cause. Indeed, the argument of 
this article is that the optimal clause shifts back and forth over the career of each worker. Be-
cause of the problems with the penalty default model in this context, the discussion of it is 
relegated to a footnote. 
192. Richard Epstein puts it succinctly: "the phrase 'at will' is two words long and has the 
convenient virtue of meaning just what it says, no more and no less." Epstein, supra note 10, at 
955. 
193. See generally Roger I. Abrams & Dennis R. Nolan, Toward a Theory of ''Just Cause" in 
Employee Discipline Cases, 1985 DUKE L.J. 594. 
194. Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577, 577-78 
(1988) (defining as "crystalline" those often arbitrary property law rules that attempt to delimit 
rights in unambiguous terms, so as to create clear expectations in those who are subject to the 
rules - for example, the rule allowing a subsequent real estate purchaser to take property free of 
any unrecorded preexisting claim). 
195. Id. at 578 (defining as "mud" amorphous legal doctrines that make it difficult for parties 
to know their rights in advance - for example, nuisance law). 
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ployment for the first fifteen years of the relationship but just cause 
thereafter. The employer would have a strategic incentive to review 
an employee at fourteen years and eleven months and terminate if 
forecasts of future performance were not rosy, even if current perform-
ance were adequate. The costs of termination to an employee after 
nearly fifteen years are tremendous.196 But under the more malleable 
life-cycle default, the strategic doomsday evaporates. An employer, 
unsure when the at-will standard changes to just cause, is more likely 
to act in good faith. 
Under either approach, then, a life-cycle default rule is optimal. 
To reiterate, under a life-cycle default, the court presumes that mid-
career employees have an at-will relationship with their employer be-
cause that contractual structure best deters opportunistic behavior by 
the parties. Late-career employees, by contrast, are ripe for opportu-
nistic termination, and so courts require good cause for terminating 
such employees. The optimal standard for new employees is more 
nuanced. On the one hand, employees who have quit other jobs or 
who have significant moving expenses perhaps should have a reliance 
damages default. On the other hand, employers often need a proba-
tionary period to sort out poor matches. Perhaps a default probation-
ary period should be presumed, absent unusual reliance expenditures 
by the beginning employees. 
B. Relational Contract Default Rules 
Recently, the literature on default rules has examined long-term 
relational contracts. The debate centers on whether simple or com-
plex rules are better able to deter opportunistic behavior in the rela-
tionship. Some have argued that complex default rules that consider 
the particular circumstances of the parties better control the strategic 
behavior problems of relational contracts. 197 Certainly the life-cycle 
default, which is premised on the fact that both employer and em-
ployee can exploit the other's sunk costs, attempts to control strategic 
behavior on both sides. In this way it is a complex default rule. 
In contrast, Robert Scott has noted that most default rules in com-
mercial relational contracts tend to be simple, categorical, and winner-
196. We do see contracts, particularly collective bargaining contracts, that explicitly call for 
a switch from at will to just cause after a probationary period. As I have suggested, these proba-
tionary periods create an incentive to review the employee immediately before just cause vests. 
Almost invariably, however, probationary periods are short - three months, six months, one 
year - and thus regulate beginning employees. The short time horizon limits the sunk costs the 
employee has at stake. 
197. Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Relationships and the Selection of Default Rules for 
Remote Risks, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 535 (1990). 
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take-all. 198 Scott cautions that these prevailing default rules may have 
normative force, so that concocting a complex default may be a mis-
guided attempt to control strategic behavior.199 As he emphasizes, 
legal rules "are both a threat and a temptation."200 Legal attempts to 
prevent opportunism by one side invite evasive responses from the 
other side. Certainly this is true for employment relations. Preventing 
employer opportunism by a just-cause standard invites increased em-
ployee shirking. Scott concludes by emphasizing that legal sanctions 
are not the only control on opportunism.201 Social forces of reciproc-
ity and honesty, particularly when benefits accrue to a good reputa-
tion, are powerful deterrents. Rather than legally enshrining these 
social norms, which may destroy the informality that makes them so 
effective, the optimal structure may rely on clear, harsh, legal defaults 
combined with social sanctions against failure to cooperate. 
Scott's argument against complex, contextualized defaults is pow-
erful in the commercial context in which he uses it, but its lessons may 
justify a life-cycle default here. First, the life-cycle default may not fall 
on the complex side of Scott's spectrum. Although parties could not 
easily agree on the tipping points, the life-cycle default does call for a 
categorical legal winner at every point in the relationship. In that 
sense, the default is clearer than a default rule that calls for sharing. 
Second, to the extent a life-cycle default is complex, its complexity 
arises from the common law, albeit still in embryonic form; Scott ob-
jects to complex default rules that the common law has ignored or 
rejected. Thus, like Scott, I am using the common law to provide both 
a positive description and a normative base for a life-cycle default rule. 
Finally, Scott's argument focuses on commercial relationships of in-
definite or permanent length. The opportunism can come at any time 
by either side, usually in response to exogenous shocks to the relation-
ship. While random shocks can also disturb employment relation-
ships, the inevitable life cycle of the employment relationship presents 
clear end-game and beginning-game problems, in which the em-
ployer's potential for opportunism becomes predictable and one-sided. 
In midcycle, by contrast, the self-interest of the employer in not firing 
productive workers provides a nonlegal check on arbitrary firings, so 
the law should focus on the possible opportunism by employees. 
Given this predictable cycle, the legal default rule for employment ter-
198. Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 597 (1990). 
199. Id. at 611. 
200. Id. at 613. 
201. Id. at 615. 
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minations can focus more precisely on opportunistic threats than can a 
default rule in the usual commercial relationship. 
V. THE VARIETY OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS 
A. Who Are the Life-Cycle Workers? 
At the beginning of this article, I noted the great variety of em-
ployment relationships. In subsequent sections, I concentrated on the 
career employment relationship with two defining characteristics: (1) 
both sides invest heavily in the relationship in ways that will be lost if 
the relationship is severed prematurely;202 and (2) contracting 
problems prevent easy monitoring of work performance or verification 
of poor performance to outsiders. It is time to consider what workers 
fit the life-cycle model. Table 1 provides the framework.203 
TABLE 1 
TYPES OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS 
AND OPTIMAL TERMINATION STANDARDS 
Verification 
Easy 
Verification 
Hard 
General Investments 
(1) 
Standard 
Unimportant 
(2) 
At 
Will 
Specific Investments 
(3) 
Just 
Cause 
(4) 
Life Cycle 
We must determine whether just cause or at will is the preferable 
standard for a particular type of job. The employer's perspective 
depends on which row of the table applies. When verification is easy 
(top row), a just-cause presumption does not harm employers. An 
employer can simply show a court or arbitrator it has just cause for 
firing a shirking worker. By contrast, when verification is hard 
(bottom row), a just-cause standard makes employers vulnerable to 
opportunism by shirking workers because the employer cannot verify 
to a court or arbitrator the reasons it suspects shirking. 
202. These asset-specific investments can themselves be of two types. They may be skills that 
are valuable only to the particular employer, as modeled in Gary Becker's human-capital model, 
see supra note 18, and illustrated in Figure 1. They can also be the employee's decision to climb 
the career ladder, whereby hard work, even using general skills, is rewarded by late-career perks 
and bonuses. This is the efficiency-wage model as depicted in Figure 2. 
203. Oliver Williamson presents a similar table in WILLIAMSON, supra note 17, at 247, but he 
uses it to reach more general conclusions about employment-governance structures. 
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The employee's perspective depends on which column applies. 
When workers have made only general investments (left column), 
their skills are transferable to another firm. Even if they are 
terminated from one firm, they are not hurt greatly because other 
firms are willing to pay them comparable wages. Because 
terminations are less costly to employees in this column, at-will 
protection is adequate. By contrast, when workers have made firm.-
specific investments, which include entering an individual firm's career 
ladder (right column), they suffer greatly from termination. 
These observations lead to easy conclusions for the off-diagonal 
boxes (2) and (3). The employer and employee perspectives clash 
more directly in boxes (1) and (4). In box (1), neither party is 
vulnerable, so the discharge standard is less important. I have spent 
the bulk of the article addressing box ( 4) and will simply reiterate that 
a life-cycle rule best accommodates the mutual vulnerability. 
The more challenging task is pigeonholing a worker or job in a 
particular box. One dichotomy is between general investments and 
specific investments. Jobs in which both sides have made only general 
investments are nearly an empty set among workers with more than a 
few years' experience. Importantly, investments are broader than job 
skills. Many, perhaps most, workers have skills that many firms value 
and are thus general. These general skills make them less vulnerable 
to opportunism. But most workers develOp specific ties to their 
workplace - familiar faces and routines - that they will lose if they 
leave. Often, workers enter a career job ladder with a particular firm, 
assuming that hard work will lead to promotions and future rewards. 
If one defines workers with specific investments as workers who will 
suffer from job loss, most experienced workers fall into this 
category. 204 
It is harder to draw the line that separates jobs in which acceptable 
job performance is easy to monitor and verify from jobs in which 
monitoring and verification is hard. Perhaps common law courts can 
draw the line - as they draw so many others - on an intuitive, case-
by-case basis. This approach would be acceptable if the courts kept 
the function of the line in mind. The line is supposed to separate jobs 
in which a just-cause requirement will not create severe shirking 
problems from jobs in which an employer cannot easily prove 
objectionable employee behavior to a court and so employers cannot 
credibly threaten to fire shirking employees. 
Some have suggested that high-level as opposed to low-level jobs 
204. Construction workers, with their transient job sites, are perhaps an exception. 
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present such a dichotomy. An employer may only have an unprovable 
sense that a high-level worker is not performing adequately. Such jobs 
have many intangible characteristics, such as the ability to motivate 
and work with others. By contrast, low-level jobs usually involve the 
performance of tangible and verifiable tasks. Even such a staunch and 
eloquent advocate of just cause as Professor St. Antoine has suggested 
that high-level employees should be exempt from a comprehensive 
just-cause scheme.205 He has suggested that we should draw an 
indirect line excluding from just-cause protection employees entitled 
to a pension above a certain amount or employees who have fixed-term 
contracts of two years or more. 206 
One must be careful of class myopia in making such proposals. 
Most jobs, even the most unskilled or menial, require complex mental 
states to perform them well. Boredom, frustration, and low morale 
can impair performance on any job. While sometimes this fact 
manifests itself in objective, verifiable ways, many times it does not. 
Certainly job status and job complexity do not correlate well. 
Nevertheless, a duality exists between jobs requiring simple, repetitive 
tasks and those requiring complex, varied tasks. If the tasks are 
simple and repetitive, "successful job performance is relatively easy to 
define and measure in ways that virtually every reasonable person 
would consider fair, accurate, thorough, and objective."201 
Courts and commentators have thoroughly debated the analogous 
issue in employment discrimination law; few tests for job applicants 
have survived a challenge of bias. If objective tests cannot be found to 
evaluate job applicants, we should not expect employers to be able to 
provide objective evidence of cause when they fire a worker for not 
performing adequately. Mark Kelman has noted this tension.208 In 
advocating a near ban on employment testing for applicants because 
objective criteria for hiring cannot be found, he recognizes that 
employers must be given greater leeway in dismissing workers who do 
not live up to the admittedly subjective standards of the job.209 In 
205. See St. Antoine, supra note 8, at 72 ("In the higher ranges of management, one official's 
evaluation of another's business judgment may become so intertwined with questions of fair 
personal treatment that the two cannot be separated."). Interestingly, the management advisors 
to the Model Employment Termination Act (META), for which Professor St. Antoine was the 
reporter, wanted high-level workers to be covered in order to get the advantage of displacing 
common law actions. Under the META they are covered. 
206. Id. 
207. Barbara Lerner, Washington v. Davis: Quantity, Quality and Equality in Employment 
Testing, 1976 SUP. Cr. R.Ev. 263, 280-81. 
208. Mark Kelman, Concepts of Discrimination in "General Ability" Job Testing, 104 HARV. 
L. R.Ev. 1157 (1991). 
209. Kelman, supra note 208, at 1233 (the main problem in abolishing screening tests is that 
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other words, the law cannot simultaneously squeeze both the hiring 
and firing decisions. 
I have noted already that unionized employees are universally 
governed by a just-cause standard while nonunionized private 
employees generally are not.210 One explanation for this difference is 
that unionized jobs are typically more routine or repetitive, thus 
making objective measures of performance easier and lowering the 
burden of showing cause. On the other hand, unions may demand 
regulation and rules precisely to facilitate objective evaluation of 
workers.211 If objective evaluation is feasible, the problem of 
unverifiable shirking is reduced and the just-cause requirement 
becomes less burdensome for employers. 
Finally, in considering what jobs fit the life-cycle model, we must 
recognize that the model may apply differently to female workers than 
to male workers because the career-employment pattern differs. For 
many women, the end of the life cycle is not the period of greatest 
vulnerability. Rather, their time of concern is the middle period, when 
many women leave the workforce temporarily to have children. A 
common employment pattern is for women to "prove themselves" by 
working hard early in their career in exchange for implicit promises 
that the employer will give them greater flexibility in early child-
rearing years. Having performed their end of the bargain, women face 
the danger that an employer will behave opportunistically by 
dismissing them rather than giving them the promised flexibility. The 
law regulates these opportunistic firings under Title VII and other 
antidiscrimination laws. Although our general analysis against 
opportunistic firings applies to this situation, the common law rules we 
have analyzed apply more often and more cleanly to "traditional," 
that is male, life-cycle patterns.212 Certainly, men have brought most 
of the leading life-cycle wrongful discharge cases. 
B. The Rise (and Fall?) of Career Employment 
If legal intervention at the end of the life cycle is so wise, a critical 
there "would be pressure to loosen controls on discharge ... as a practical response to the needs 
of the employer''). 
210. See supra Part II. 
211. See Leslie, supra note 17, at 369-70. · 
212. See generally Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of 
Workplace Norms, 42 V AND. L. REv. 1183, 1221 (1989) (workplace norms "reflect their history 
as institutions shaped by and for men"); Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term -
Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REv. 10, 41 (1987) (asking whether pregnancy 
leave violates equal treatment because it "treat[s] men as the norm and presume[s] a workplace 
designed for men (or nonpregnant persons)"). 
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reader might ask, why did it take courts so long to get it? Or, alterna-
tively, one might ask whether this sudden judicial rush to protect some 
workers suggests an unwise departure from the wisdom of the past. In 
response, I would emphasize that career employment is relatively re-
cent in our economy, becoming common only after World War II. 
Thus, only in the last decade or two have employers and workers 
played out the end game of career employment. Therefore, courts 
have only recently had the opportunity to respond to opportunistic 
behavior at the end of the life cycle. 
Certainly, career employment was less prominent fifty or seventy-
five years ago. Henry Ford introduced his five-dollar-per-day pay in 
1914 in large part to counter the phenomenal turnover in his River 
Rouge factory, which exceeded 2000% per year.213 Much of the rise 
in career employment can be attributed to the growth of firm size and 
the increasing costs of employee turnover and lack of discipline.214 
Immigration and reverse migration before the 1920s delayed a sense of 
community and roots among workers, diminishing a desire for job se-
curity. 215 Not until after World War II did pensions- a key bonding 
feature of career employment - become prevalent. In short, until the 
last few decades few workers spent their lives in a single career 
employment. 
Because of the recent rise in career employment, I need not dispute 
Richard Epstein's claim that at will was the optimal rule to regulate 
the employment relationship for much of this century.216 Whether it 
was or not, times have changed, and the common law has changed 
with it. With the rise of career employment has come the life-cycle 
doctrine in employment law. 
Some commentators suggest that career employment is becoming a 
thing of the past.211 One bit of evidence for this claim is the decline in 
213. See ALLAN NEVINS, FORD: THE TIMES, THE MAN, THE CoMPANY 512-41 (1954); 
supra note 32. 
214. See DoERINGER & PIORE, supra note 52; Victor P. Goldberg, A Relational Exchange 
Perspective on the Employment Relationship, in FIRMS, ORGANIZATION AND LABOUR 127 
(Frank H. Stephen ed., 1984). 
215. See Sanford M. Jacoby, Industrial Labor Mobility in Historical Perspective, 22 INDUS. 
REL. 261, 267 (1983) (between 1920 and 1950, workers gradually "became more attached to 
their employers" and "employers became more committed to their workforce"); Sanford M. 
Jacoby, The New Institutionalism: What Can It Leamfrom the Old?, 29 INDUS. REL. 316, 327 
(1990) ("Workers born in the U.S. were more likely than mobile immigrants to value attach-
ments to particular employers and communities."). 
216. See Epstein, supra note 10. 
217. See BENNE'IT HARRlsON & BARRY BLUESTONE, THE GREAT U-TuRN: CORPORATE 
Rl!sTRUCTURING AND THE POLARIZING OF AMERICA (1988); RICHARD S. BELOUS, THE CON-
TINGENT EcONOMY: THE GROWTH OF THE TEMPORARY, PART-TIME AND SUBCONTRACTED 
WORKFORCE (1989). 
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pension coverage in the 1980s.218 If life-cycle contracts decline in im-
portance, one might expect parties to call on courts less frequently to 
enforce perceived opportunism. As career employment ebbs, so too 
may lawsuits ebb whose underlying theories rest on a breach of a long-
term relationship. 
CONCLUSION 
The. argument of this article has a classic form - it puts court 
decisions in an area of law into a framework and thereby declares 
them to have some coherence. In this case, the declaration is that 
courts, with their embryonic life-cycle doctrine, are reacting wisely to 
the issues litigants present to them. The life-cycle framework that 
courts have developed provides the parties in a career employment re-
lationship a legal structure that checks opportunistic behavior. Its 
fundamental premise is that both employer and employees can act op-
portunistically. Consequently, a life-cycle analysis does not categori-
cally condemn or celebrate employment at will. It supports, in broad 
outline, the contract law inroads that have been made on the at-will 
doctrine, particularly at the beginning and the end of an employee's 
career, and it explains the continued vitality of the at-will rule for mid-
career employees. The current position of the courts is superior to a 
dogmatic insistence on the old at-will regime, which creates an exces-
sive risk of opportunistic terminations for long-term, and sometimes 
beginning-career workers. Moreover, the current hesitant, intermedi-
ate position may also be superior to a general just-cause standard, 
which would lead to excessive shirking by midcareer workers. 
The life-cycle framework therefore makes coherent the seemingly 
schizophrenic behavior by cburts in employment termination cases. 
Within the framework, courts will protect employees when the danger 
of employer opportunism is high, but they will retain the at-will pre-
sumption when the employer is more vulnerable. One can thus argue 
that the courts are reacting appropriately to the employment-termina-
tion cases they encounter. 
This coherence in the common law is internal to the system. In 
particular, it assumes that common law litigation is the chosen method 
of resolving these disputes, and that the courts largely do not consider 
the systemic costs of litigation. It may be preferable, all things consid-
ered, to opt for an administrative or arbitration system that requires 
just cause for all employment terminations. But it is unfair, in arguing 
218. See David E. Bloom & Richard B. Freeman, The Fall in Private Pension Coverage in the 
United States, 82 AM. EcoN. REV., May 1992, at 539 (papers and proceedings documenting 
decline in pension coverage in 1980s). 
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for such a change, to portray the current common law as hopeless 
chaos. Far from being chaotic, the current common law provides opti-
mal rules for regulating employment terminations. 
